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ABSTRACT

Since 2001, members of the U.S. military and Afghan communities have been living alongside each other
as part of the international political intervention and military campaign Operation Enduring Freedom. A
schism occurred between Afghan societies in relation to this involvement, which in turn produced
relationships between foreign troops and Afghan civilians, the state apparatus and insurgents. An
international discourse of propaganda using gender as a tool surrounded the conflict and attempted to
justify the presence of foreign militaries in Afghanistan by framing the U.S. as rescuers, liberating Afghan
victims from Afghan oppressors. A counterinsurgency doctrine was developed after Afghanistan resisted
the international hegemonic vision for the country, asking troops to battle for the hearts and minds of
Afghans. U.S. troop’s reflections about their experiences in Afghanistan reveal a division in how these
roles and relationships are imagined in the propaganda and doctrine and how they are experienced by
the U.S. military’s service members. The relationship with Afghan communities is problematized and
given context in this project as remembered and perceived by the U.S. troops. Representations were
deconstructed and reconstructed by the troops revealing the perception of themselves and Afghans, the
roles of the groups and the impact of foreign military presence in Afghanistan. Their identities develop
while attempting to encourage hegemonic visions in the uniform of a foreign military other. U.S. troops
perceptions are heavily influenced by media, propaganda and discourse, yet the reflections on their own
experiences often question and challenge the realities of relationships between Afghans and themselves,
blurring the lines between liberation and occupation.
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1. Introduction
United States (U.S.) troops based in Afghanistan are witnessing their
international military allies leave the country, nation by nation as the foreign led
intervention Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF), which commenced in 2001,
draws to a theoretic end (Alfsen, 2011, p.15). It has been the longest war the
United States has fought, while Afghanistan has only experienced intermittent
absences from the playbooks of both modern and ancient foreign militaries and
imperialists (Kreisher, 2013; Bearden, 2001). The most recent intervention into
Afghanistan placed U.S. troops alongside Afghan society, producing interactions
and segmentation between U.S. service members and the population within the
country known for this project as base-host relationships. A societal split has
taken place, as some Afghans have become part of the state apparatus invented
by the international community after the 2001 invasion, such as the Afghan
National Security Forces (ANSF) (Baron, 2013). Others are part of a political and
combative opposition to foreign presence. Being comprised mostly of those loyal
to the Taliban, the establishment that was ousted by the invasion, they are
labeled insurgents by the U.S. and other foreign troops (Samples 2008).

The

final group discussed is made up of Afghan civilians, who are portrayed as the
basis and need for the conflict (Abu-Lughod 2002). Both sides of the fight, U.S.
troops and insurgents, have tried to gain this groups’ allegiance while the conflict
has consequently brought collateral damage to their communities (Bose 2013).
U.S. troops experiences with and descriptions of these groups challenge and
confirm the expectations for these interactions whether in opposition or defense
of the U.S. led intervention. Today, the war continues and critics claim defeat on
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a number of levels including governance and base host relationships. Afghans
are divided over identities of support, neutrality and opposition to the foreign
militaries and insurgency that often change on a daily basis during this conflict.
U.S. troops are tasked with attempting a mission with a fluid host often resulting
in a major loss of blood and economic treasure. U.S. troops have also become
confused over insurgent’s inability to submit to their presence while Afghan
civilians and the Western formed Afghan government and security forces are
both indifferent to, and participate with, (dis)loyalty to the hegemonic vision. The
following vignette was offered by Golf, a participant in this study on the
relationship between U.S. military members and Afghan society, demonstrating
the tension within these players’ relationships.
“We almost had a real serious incident…Afghans are very, very rough on all
animals, dogs included. They don’t really value animals at all.” However, it was
common for U.S. forces to adopt orphaned dogs in Afghanistan to live on base
with them. On both deployments, Golf’s base had dogs that were raised up from
abandoned puppies on garbage and MRE’s (Military issued food- Meals Ready
to Eat). “We fed and raised them.” But he explained that all the dogs hated the
Afghans and only trusted you if you were in a U.S. uniform. The dogs would bark
and growl at Afghan employees and military and he explained the Americans
wouldn’t stop the dogs’ hostilities and thought it was instead funny. One
interpreter was attacked by a dog that “took a good chunk out of him.” A Special
Forces member came to the scene and sent the dog away. After the interpreter
thanked the American for saving him from the dog, the soldier punched him,
knocking the interpreter to the ground. One evening the platoon was off base but
the Afghans and dogs remained. When the U.S. troops returned, they found one
of their two dogs dead and the other with its paws cut off. “By the time someone
rational got on the radio the platoon was back in the base and had the entire
Afghan security force zip cuffed on their knees, ready to execute the entire thing.”
They were eventually talked down from what Golf saw as being a potentially very
bad situation, “over a dog.” (Golf)

This story perhaps reflects the wider imagination for what troops would like to
achieve or perceive what they are able to achieve as a foreign military in
Afghanistan if they rescue, feed and defend Afghanistan’s people. But this bond
and loyalty is not formed through foreign intervention. It also is telling of what
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happens to Afghans when they work alongside the U.S. or are perceived as
favoring their presence. One of the more troubling issues brought up in this
experience demonstrated the tensions within the relationship between U.S. and
Afghan troops. Out of all the relationships amongst the groups, this one is seen
as crucial to the hegemonic vision as these two groups are suppose to be
working together in official cooperation.
Gender was used to represent and define Afghanistan in order to define
the geopolitical relationship that has taken place since the buildup to the war.
These emotional portrayals attempted to offer an explanation to why the U.S.
believed they were justified in the invasion and then stayed to state build
alongside its allies. This representation was used to highlight the differences
between U.S. and Afghan society through an orientalist lens as well as portray
the country as a gendered dichotomy a female victims and male villains. Afghan
men were represented through depictions of the Taliban, holding them
responsible and offered a rather limited scope of the complex male identities in
Afghanistan who shaped the political process or gender policies in the country
before and during the war. Women were brought to the forefront of this portrayal
and were defined, as victims who would only continue to be oppressed without
Western intervention. Intervention and the subsequent state building were
portrayed as a way to displace this report’s interpretation of gender oppression.
Hegemonic and foreign interactions were supported by the notion that gender
justice could be gained through war. Interaction was purported to be a solution
to this representation (Abu-Lughod, 2002).
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These representations of gender fixated on the absence of women in the
Afghan public sphere and equated this with oppression. Common conclusions
include that they were invisible and inactive when in public because they wore
burkas. Some believed that foreign intervention would liberate these women to
the point of removing their covers. However many continued to wear them and
this signified a complication in understanding the offered gender narrative in
Afghanistan, revealing that the representations of gender were based on a
limited context. As for the men, the narratives offered had failed to mention the
identities and actions of Afghan men outside of the Taliban who aided foreign
powers. Many of these men were responsible for brutality to women since before
the war began and continue these methods today (Kolhatkar and Ingalls, 2006,
p. 115-116). However, this was a strategic ignorance as their assistance was
essential for the military and state building efforts.

These alliances ignored

women’s issues, instead marketing blame on women’s oppression on the enemy.
Women’s lives in Afghanistan were packaged into a narrative that supported
foreign and allied Afghan visions, still making women absent. The intervention
claimed this was a liberating act for women but in order to do so, they abused
men deemed enemies. When gender justice is focused on women, it overlooks
gender-based violence against men and ignores gender as a category for proper
treatment of people not just women. In the case of the Afghan war, many of
these men deemed enemies have been tortured and imprisoned without formal
charges or rights as prisoners as they are considered terrorists, a category used
to dehumanize those involved in political conflicts (Roth, 2004, p. 2-7; Puar and
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Rai, 2002, p. 117-148). Institutional rights were granted to women through the
state building process such as representation in the government and wider
access to healthcare and education. Freedom gained is hard to measure. First
because the effects of war have a tremendous effect on women and deeper
social practices; and security concerns have continued to limit their involvement
in the public sphere. Second, their immense impact and involvement in the
private sphere is overlooked and not always seen as valuable. Progress claimed
by invasion or that women’s agony somehow ended with the fall of the Taliban is
shortsighted and fulfilling to those who support the intervention. With foreign
presence in the country since the war it is difficult to predict how realistic these
claims are of Afghan progress as they are inorganic and will inevitably change
after foreign withdrawal. Hegemonic politics while claiming to elevate women's
rights; actually avoids them or exploits them when making war (Barakat and
Wardell, 2002). “As is often the case, the increased militarization of Afghan
society made women more subject to violence than at any time before”
(Hirschkind and Mahmood, 2002, p. 345).
Foreign troops representations of self and Afghan society are built through
this interaction they have experienced as participants in the war. Experiences
offer a limited scope of understanding gender and societal narratives although
their representations are valuable in that they complicate and reaffirm the
narratives describing this interaction and descriptions. They have their own of
interpretations of society and gender with descriptions built on their interactions
with Afghan society as opposed to laying groundwork for justification of the war
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as previous representations had offered. These are different representations of
gender, power and community outside of the public representations. Most of the
troops surveyed and interviewed experience a higher ratio of interactions with
men. A description of interaction or assistance to women was shown as indirect.
This revealed that this attention to women’s issues was absent despite how it
was marketed. These interactions affected how they characterized Afghans and
ultimately affected their opinions, creating a cycle that would continue to affect
their interactions with and memories of Afghan society. Troops’ representations
of Afghans reveal orientalist descriptions and a variation of trying to understand
the other through a lens of occupation. These descriptions explain how foreign
presence is impacted by gender representations and vice versa through the
interactions between foreign troops and Afghan society. It offers an expansion to
how it is popularly imagined reported and represented.
The war has placed these incongruent and unfamiliar communities
working in conflict and cooperation together, while popular discourses
surrounding these dealings have deployed gender as a tool to describe and
suggest the expectations for interaction between them (Cloud, 2004). Two public
discourses emerged under this military campaign; propaganda claiming
liberation, meant to justify the incursion into Afghanistan and a counterinsurgency
policy that asked U.S. troops to win Afghan’s hearts and minds (Exum 2011).
These discourses portrayed Afghan society and U.S. troops via a gendered lens
to oversimplify the contact, and ultimately the conflict and cooperation between
these players, ignoring the complex gender dynamics, identities and histories of
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Afghans and U.S. troops. These imagined descriptions placed the U.S. troops in
a role describing them as a force of good guys attempting to heroically rescue
and liberate Afghan society from a sovereign regime described as villainous bad
guys. Afghan society was often reduced to a one-dimensional victim with visual
descriptions and commentary focusing on the country’s burka covered female
population to prove that supposition (Abu-Lughod, 2002). The society’s
empowerment was then further seen as dependent on counterinsurgency
policies, claiming that Afghan advancement and cooperation could be achieved
based on how troops interacted with Afghan’s hearts and minds.
To a certain extent the conversations and expectations are projected and
discussed by outsiders and those in power. Whether it is amongst popular U.S.
society or high ranking U.S. military commanders, they are outside of the sphere
and general experience that U.S. troops have working (in)directly with Afghan
society through base host relationships. This thesis argues that both foreign
troops (U.S. and its allies) and Afghan people are part of a gendered
representation in the discourse and have little access to the political process
while being direct players, defying and embodying the rhetoric as well as serving
as symbols and scapegoats of why progress is or is not made in the Afghan war.
This argument was established through comparisons to similar historical patterns
where foreign militaries attempted to develop nations based on their country’s
perceptions and policies while convincing local populations they were occupying,
colonized or invaded in order to support them (Spivak, 1988). U.S. troops in
Afghanistan form identities as both the other and agents of a hegemonic
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strategy. Narratives of their perceptions and experiences with Afghan society
reflect

a

depiction

that

contradicts,

challenges

and

reflects

gender

representations and expectations imagined by two popular discourses based on
gendered and romanticized notions of war and occupation as liberation and
counterinsurgency achievable through winning Afghan hearts and minds. U.S.
military member’s experiences often relate a certain belief in the policy or popular
discourse while revealing the belief that it is an uphill battle and possibly
unachievable due to the fluid nature of their relationships and personal opinions
about Afghan society.
Through interviews and an online survey, veterans and active U.S. military
offered their understanding of these dynamics against the gendered backdrop of
liberation and the hearts and minds campaign. To secure anonymity, I replaced
the names of the most active participants in this thesis with names from the
military alphabet system, Alpha through Yankee and collectively refer to them as
Alpha Yankee.
Since troops are often talked about but have little access to the main
discourse, their voice is crucial to better understanding the sociology of war. This
thesis aims at describing their perceptions and experiences concerning their
affect and interaction with Afghan communities and the Afghans effect on the
troops and their roles and responsibilities. U.S. military members serving abroad
are in a unique historical position within the context of international relations.
When developing the project, I wanted to speak with current military members
and veterans of the Afghan War since 2001.

In order to understand these
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equations better, I developed a fieldwork process to ascertain how U.S. troops
characterized their presence and role within the war. Through online surveys
and different methods of interview, I was able to collect data that renegotiates the
perceived gendered equations that designates U.S. troops as a foreign force in
Afghanistan.
Those that did participate in the surveys and interviews served in all years
of the war until 2011 as well as every region within Afghanistan. There were
forty-eight participants that completed the survey, with about fifteen of those
deciding to participate in some form of the interview process as well. Interviews
were conducted in person, over the phone and through emails. While mostly
men participated, a few women also responded. The most dominant age range
when serving in Afghanistan was 18-23, most of which were 24-29 at the time of
the survey. Each participant had different roles within the war and experiences
with Afghan people and these interactions were reflected in their memory
sometimes from experiences that occurred months or years earlier.
Attitudes towards the study were both positive and negative. Many of the
participants were excited to give their viewpoints on a part of the Afghan
narrative that they felt rarely gets discussed or understood outside the
propaganda and policy. Some of the troops questioned the motives of the study
and were unsure of why many of the questions asked about Afghans and their
society. Negative reactions ranged from unwillingness to respond citing national
security to a fear this study would place unnecessary stress on troops with the
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only goal being to further my career. In the end, those that did participate
provided valuable insight into the ideas being discussed in this thesis.
This thesis will contain five additional chapters that delve into the history,
process and analysis of the gendered descriptions of these groups, public
discourses and U.S. troop perceptions of the Afghan war. Following this
introduction, a brief history will be given regarding Afghanistan and its current
societal structures and conflicts, U.S. imperialism and discourse, as well as prior
interactions these two nations have had that has played a role in the
development of the topics being discussed. An analysis of relevant literature on
liberation, counterinsurgency, and how gender roles were imagined and
represented in this conflict, being discussed to provide readers context of prior
work relevant to this study. A section stating my procedures for this study,
including the survey and interview process, will also be provided. Once a
background has been established, original research discovered through the
surveys and interviews will be given and analyzed. This study breaks down the
troop’s experiences into two chapters, liberation and counterinsurgency, in an
effort to challenge U.S. policy and actions. As the thesis concludes, a final
analysis will be given tying relevant historical facts, prior literature as well as
current discourse and policies to that of troop’s experiences in the Afghan
conflict. These connections will help add to the discussion of problems that arise
from foreign intervention and imperialistic pursuits under the guise of liberation
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2. Discourse, Roles and Relationships
This study examines the relationships between U.S. troops, Afghan
civilians, insurgents and state agents. Each of these groups plays an important
role within the dynamics and relationships of the conflict. These base host
relationships place U.S. troops as a foreign other in Afghanistan while wearing
the military uniform of a global hegemonic power. This chapter offers literature
that depicts and critiques the justification for this war as well as the policies and
discourses formed to fulfill their goals. As this study identifies relationships and
applies them to the discourses attempting to direct each group, it is important to
understand their backgrounds. Both the propaganda describing liberation and
counterinsurgency doctrine attempting to win hearts and minds built expectations
around the relationships between Afghan society and U.S. troops.

These

discourses used gender as a frame to describe the roles within these base host
relationships. The notions of liberation and hearts and minds will be
deconstructed within the Afghan theatre, both offering and critiquing them with
literature that problematizes and maintains these concepts to provide a
foundation for the narratives and perceptions of research participants.

2.1 Justification for Intervention
On September 11, 2001, hijackers overtook four civilian commercial flights
and crashed them into the Pentagon in Virginia and the twin towers of the World
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Trade Center in New York City. The subsequent deaths that took place from the
building’s fires and collapse were etched and experienced not only by the
eyewitnesses but those who experienced it through broadcasts around the world.
It was a shock to America’s citizenry and quickly sent the public and government
scrambling to respond to who was responsible for the attacks. Mullah Omar, the
Taliban leader had his foreign minister Wakil Ahmad Muttawakil issue a
statement the day of the attacks on behalf of Omar saying "We denounce this
terrorist attack, whoever is behind it” ("CNN").

However, despite the

condolences and denial of any support in the attack, the U.S. discourse
portrayed the Afghan nationalist regime to be synonymous and in close affiliation
with al-Qaeda, an international terrorist network who ultimately took responsibility
for the attack. Al-Qaeda operated through a global network, but their leader
Osama bin Laden was based in Afghanistan. As events continued to unfold, the
perpetrators and their actions began to be defined. David Frum, President
George W. Bush’s speechwriter, described the U.S. administration’s take on the
events:
Within 48 hours, [Bush] had made the two key decisions that have defined the
war on terror. First, this is a war, not a crime. And second, this war is not going to
be limited to just the authors of the 9/11 attack but to anyone who assisted them
and helped them and made their work possible, including states. And that is a
dramatic, dramatic event. And that defines everything. (Kirk)

While U.S. political discourse and media were sorting out their versions of
who the perpetrators were to these acts of terror, they were also defining the
roles and reasoning for invading Afghanistan. The United States further
reinforced that they perceived the terrorist act as war and not a crime when they
launched their response militarily and not judicially. In the fall of 2001, George

Sarah Cosette 13
Bush announced a Global War on Terror (GWOT), Afghanistan being the first
campaign (Bush, 2001). On October 7th, 2001, combat operations began under
the campaign Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF). By November of that year the
United States was establishing their first ground bases within Afghanistan (Brown
2012). A series of victories early in the campaign led the United States to believe
they had triumphed and that their liberation of Afghanistan was progressing as
planned when they ousted the Taliban from power. Bush had described GWOT
as a “crusade,” making some suspect this was a wider war on Islam although this
was officially denied and said to be a mistaken description (Bush, 2001).
The United States pursued its goal in the invasion and political relationship
thereafter with the assistance of the Northern Alliance, the Taliban's domestic
rival, as well as a comprehensive commitment of logistical and combat support
from the international community. The Northern Alliance while the underdog in
Afghan de facto leaderships at the time, were actually remnants of the massive
network of warlords and corruption that had wreaked havoc on the country prior
to the Taliban’s vigilante movement and consequential takeover of Afghanistan
(Conetta, 2012). Instead, a new government would be formed in Bonn, Germany,
which would exclude the Taliban and put anti-Taliban warlords in positions of
official and unofficial power. With the U.S. military taking root in the country, it
was not always clear where this new government, lead by Hamid Karzai, would
rank in the power structure of Afghanistan (Suhrke, 2007; Ferguson, 2007; Hehir,
2007).
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To understand the current relationship between U.S. troops and Afghan
society it is important to understand that while the U.S. framed their launch on
Afghanistan as where this global war on terror would take place, they were also
entering and taking sides in a civil war in the country. While many reasons
behind the war were geopolitical, they were portrayed as liberation and often on
behalf of Afghan women. It is important to understand how gender and
geopolitics related to one another within the Taliban, Al-Qaeda and the U.S.
government. For many Afghans, the Taliban was a new direction for the country
and a much-needed response to the widespread turmoil of the Afghan/Soviet
conflict in the 1980s and then civil war that proceeded when they came to power
in the mid 1990’s. Over their tenure the Taliban were criticized for the strictness
that that they asserted to form a more perfect union, free from the unrest and
exploitation by Afghan warlords who had a far worse human rights track record
and are a part of the current Afghan government leadership. Throughout their
codes of conduct they were severe on curbing pedophilia, rape, kidnapping and
the mutilation of women and rates of these occurrences steadily dropped
(Rashid, 2001). Alas, their vigilante-gendered justice was not picked up by
airwaves as much as their preventing women from leaving their homes,
institutionalized veiling, including the head to toe burka garment and closing their
schools. Schools, the Taliban said, were not to be closed permanently, but would
rather be opened only when a new national curriculum was developed and the
streets were safer.

The community support to standing up to the warlords

became backlash when new formed boundaries proved unpopular (Rashid,
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2001). While these practices were fluid depending on the security and presence
of Taliban armed forces in the area, they were publicly associated with misogyny
and extremism. Often, they were frustrated by ignorance to their reasoning and
claimed outsiders needed to improve their understanding of Afghanistan; they
believed their actions revered women and were quite the opposite (Murphy,
2010). The Taliban’s noted victories included the overwhelming total reduction in
drug cultivation and trade as well as cutting down on weapons stockpiling by
civilians (Rashid, 2001).
Concurrently, Osama Bin Laden, after being expelled from Saudi Arabia
and African countries took refuge in Afghanistan. As the leader of al-Qaeda, his
U.S. opposition network attacked U.S. diplomatic and military installations
overseas prior to 9/11 in reaction to U.S. military efforts and bases in the Middle
East and their support in the creation of Israel. Bin Laden had relocated his
network to Afghanistan before the Taliban came to power. He had previously
fought alongside the mujahedeen in the Soviet/Afghan conflict and was
welcomed and hosted by an Afghan warlord. Under the honor code of
Pashtunwali, Pashtun Afghans honor relied on concepts of hospitality,
forgiveness, sanctuary and revenge (Coll, 2001). The Taliban came across Bin
Laden in their country as they came to power, and accepted that he was to
remain a protected guest under Pashtunwali until the international governments
who he had terrorized were able to submit proof and would grant a fair Islamic
trial. They considered Osama Bin Laden an issue that they inherited instead of
encouraging his presence as commonly portrayed. They believed that the
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amount of attention the United States gave him only fanned the flames of his
popularity and encouraged his group Al Qaeda (Stanglin, 2013). Some analysts
critique the Taliban for what they describe as harboring terrorist networks and
leaders. Some attribute much of the problem to the fact that the United States
did not give the Afghan government fair opportunities or listen to requests that
would've been granted to other international states.
The Taliban would cease to be described as a government ruling over
Afghanistan but rather part of an opposing masculinity to the United States,
grouped together with Al Qaeda, Osama Bin Laden, and other terrorists groups
that would form the Afghan opposition after the 9/11 attacks. This collection of
ideals, cultures and goals no matter how different would now be linked as one of
terrorism in the eyes of the United States government (Bush 2001).
While Afghanistan was heavily represented through female victimhood,
the portrayal of Afghan men is equally important, and needs to be deconstructed.
The villainization of men through the descriptions offered about the Taliban
seemed to package the woes of the country and conveniently placed
responsibility with the group. This was accomplished through a rendering that
described the group and the United States soon-to-be enemy in war as men
having anachronistic masculinities and medieval policies and sourced this with
their interpretation of Islam. This served to discount Afghanistan’s complicated
political history, dehumanizing them as the source of any backwards qualities
that came to symbolize the country and validate the reason for intervention. “The
Taliban in many ways have become a potent symbol of all that liberal public
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opinion regards as grievously wrong with Islamic societies these days, proof of
the intense misogyny long ascribed to Islam, and most emphatically to those
movements within Islam referred to as fundamentalist.” (Hirschkind and
Mahmood, 2002, p. 342) By showing them as anachronistic and fundamentalists
these discourses developed a strong sensibility they could be rejected by those
that considered themselves modern and advance.

Misogyny was shown as

synonymous with Islamic fundamentalism, and an explanation of the group’s
gender policies were combined with a convenient dishonesty to source the
country’s poverty and strife on the shoulders of the regime. “From the rubble left
behind by the game of super power politics played out on Afghan bodies and
communities, we can only identify the misogynist machinations of the Islamic
fundamentalist that testifies to the power this image bears, and the force it exerts
on our political imagination” (Hirschkind and Mahmood, 2002, p. 342). As the
authors also state, these representations of men also provide a scapegoat that is
able to overlook the actions of both US and Afghan society outside of this group
who have significantly contributed to harm against Afghanistan’s women
(Hirschkind and Mahmood, 2002, p. 341). “The male protector confronts evil
aggressors in the name of the right and the good, while those under his
protection submit to his order and serve as handmaids to his efforts” (Young,
2003, p. 17). In making war plans the U.S. was strategic in building Afghan
alliances in order to invade and intervene. Pashtunwali, the ethnic majority’s
code of conduct, was refuted when the U.S. cast this ideology out when refusing
to engage in the Bin Laden negotiations after 9/11, using it as way to understand
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why Bin Laden had refuge in Afghanistan as well as how to prosecute him and
avoid a massive war. This code was dismissed and instead grouped as part of
the representation that suggested an orientalist, villainous and archaic
masculinity was solely responsible for troubles in Afghanistan. Pashtunwali and
a focus on tribal allegiances, while given limited respect by leaders and teachers
in culture awareness training, was commonly thought of as the most successful
allegiance and had an incredible importance in how troops witnessed and
participated in base host relationships. (Ross, 2010, p. 25)
To gain support for the war and to use as justification for their actions, the
United States government and media described the global war on terror by
claiming anyone who fit their idea of a terrorist would be in the crosshairs. The
Taliban’s dismissal and the refusal of the U.S. to negotiate with them as a
legitimate Afghan government with a voice was further reinforced when
described by popular discourse. Through portraying Afghan society as a
dichotomy of villain and victim, the war was framed through a propaganda
claiming liberation as the opposite of terrorism. This would further reinforce
justification for intervention and a need for a heroic force to liberate Afghan
society from terrorists. Upon the invasion, American troops were portrayed by
popular discourse as rescuers of victims who could displace the villainized power
with a courageous power committed to the country’s freedom, defense and
progress. U.S. troops actions were portrayed as benevolent and a shared global
need of both the U.S. and Afghans to fight and defend against oppression and
terror.
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In placing GWOT in Afghanistan, it justified militarily occupying the country
even though Afghans were never part of the terrorism the hegemony was
supposedly fighting against. Instead, these discourses claimed that the liberation
of Afghanistan was attainable through fighting terrorism and state development.
They ignored the complex identities and histories of Afghans and instead,
simplified their portrayal of the Afghans to that of a masculine villain and feminine
victim. Any opposition to the U.S. in Afghanistan was rendered as terrorism and,
over the course of the intervention, was considered insurgency trying to diminish
liberation efforts.

2.2 Building Policy around Women in their Absence
Afghan women and their struggles with the Taliban had been a platform of
women’s rights activists such as the Feminist Majority Campaign and
Revolutionary Afghan Women’s Association (RAWA, 2001), calling for an end to
their oppression in the years before the invasion (RAWA, "About RAWA", 2001).
This platform was then used and modified as propaganda for the U.S. invasion in
2001 that claimed in many ways to be on behalf of women. Both official rhetoric
and popular media displayed these women to symbolize an emasculated Afghan
society. The Taliban was symbolized as the source of the oppression and
therefore villainized as the victimizer by public discourse.
Laura Bush, the wife of then U.S. President George W. Bush, addressed
the nation as part of this liberation propaganda a month after the invasion. She
opened by describing the Taliban and Al Qaeda as a misogynistic masculinity
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with words like brutality, control, forbid, cruelty as responsible for the suffering of
Afghan women and children. She continued to reinforce the idea that Afghan
society was a dichotomy of a feminized and infantilized victim and an oppressive
terrorist masculinity. She claimed that because of U.S. military efforts, women
and children were now “rejoicing” as they experienced freedoms such as
listening to music and learning.
Civilized people throughout the world are speaking out in horror, not only
because our hearts break for the women and children in Afghanistan but also
because, in Afghanistan, we see the world the terrorists would like to impose on
the rest of us. ("Radio Address by Mrs. Bush")

These ideas helped construct the description of the U.S. military as part of
the civilized response to the unwelcome Afghan masculinity. It also symbolized
them as a necessary protective buffer to prevent the global spread of this
oppressive masculinity. She claimed that the oppression of women was a central
goal of terrorists and asked for support in the U.S. efforts, suggesting their
intervention work was to “ensure that dignity and opportunity would be secured
for all Afghan women and children.” Historically, in most cultures women have
been lumped together with children, considered incapable of the “decisiveness”
required to conduct international politics (Kumar and Stabile, 2005). It should be
noted that in addition to the continued propaganda featuring Afghan women
throughout the war, the former first lady has continued to speak on behalf of
Afghan women and children plights as part of this platform.
Cynthia Enloe, an influential feminist theorist, describes the intersection of
hegemonic military practices and gender:
When it’s a patriarchal world that is ‘dangerous’, masculine men and feminine
women are expected to react in opposite but complimentary ways. A ‘real man’
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will become the protector in such a world. He will suppress his own fears, brace
himself and step forward to defend the weak, women and children. In the same
‘dangerous world’ women will turn gratefully and expectantly to their fathers and
husbands, real or surrogate. If a woman is a mother, then she will think of her
children, protecting them not in a manly way, but as a self-sacrificing mother.
(Militarization, 12-13)

Assuming that Afghans wanted to be liberated and welcome such a force, the
U.S. military invaded the country. This base host relationship study reveals that
U.S. troops are confounded by not being welcome as Afghans as liberators.
In their article, “Unveiling Imperialism: Media, Gender and the War on
Afghanistan”, Carole Stabile and Deepa Kumar discuss how gender and media
were used as tools within the liberation propaganda.
The central framework employed to justify the US war was thoroughly Orientalist;
it constructed the West as the beacon of civilization with an obligation to tame the
Islamic world and liberate its women. (Kumar and Stabile, 2005, p.766)

They hoped the image of Afghan women in burkas that inundated mainstream
media would bring attention to those who had worked on Afghan women’s rights
during the Taliban’s tenure. However, in these authors’ opinions, women were
merely objectified in order to construct justification for invading Afghanistan and
did not better their plights. In addition, this demonstrates that when media over
emphasizes women as an object for which to define a foreign society it further
obscures hegemonic state building goals and makes empty commitments related
to women’s rights.
The foundational text about gender and the propaganda of women’s
liberation in Afghanistan is Lila Abu Lughod’s 2002 article, “Do Muslim Women
Really Need Saving?” She complicates the propaganda and its tendency to
portray this war through static gendered descriptions of Muslim women. She
argues:
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We need to be suspicious when neat cultural icons are plastered over messier
historical and political narratives, so we need to be wary when Lord Cromer in
British-ruled Egypt, French ladies in Algeria, and Laura Bush, all with military
troops behind them, claim to be saving or liberating Muslim women. (785)

She explains that the hegemonic powers have used foreign militaries in past
colonial projects and the present Global War on Terror to respond to their
differences in gender and culture while having a fairly small scope for which to
understand those contexts. In Afghanistan, she describes how the burka became
an icon in this war while propaganda reduced the form of veiling or “covering,” to
describe part of the Taliban’s oppression. However, she questions the idea that
propagandists believed women would take off the burka during this liberation
when for so many Afghan women it is part of how they portray femininity and
negotiate access in the public space. Abu Lughod doesn’t dismiss the overthrow
of the Taliban but does believe women’s voices and cultural contexts have not
been used in redefining and rebuilding Afghanistan since the invasion. Western
tendencies to build folklore based on their own imaginations of cultural difference
about the men they are fighting and the women they are liberating has only
reinforced characterizations of the other and supported imperialism.
Stabile and Kumar say that the Afghan liberation propaganda combined a
narrative with Orientalism to justify the foreign military presence and imperial
aggression.
According to the logic of the protection scenario, women, like the penetrable,
feminized territory of the nation-state, must be protected from the predatory
advances of some real or imaginary enemy. (Kumar and Stabile, 2005, p. 770)

Through describing the country in need of protection as victimized and the
Taliban regime inadequate of the country’s control as a villain, it created an
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imagined space for a liberator. Stabile and Kumar support Enloe’s argument that
“gendered roles are created to maintain a hierarchy that keeps certain elite men
at the top, often at the expense of women, children and non-elite men” (Enloe,
2001b). Popular discourse, “treat women as objects – of official policies, of
cultural or of traditional practices – without acknowledging women’s reactions or
contributions to new laws, historic events or daily life.” While women are used as
objects to sell war, they are ignored in the actual policy making process. “The
national political arena is a sphere for men only, for those rare women who can
successfully play at being men, or at least not shake masculine presumptions”
(Enloe, 2001).
Enloe discusses how foreign militaries reveal complicated sexual politics.
She says that historically militaries institutionalized prostitution to improve
morale, prevent local women from being raped and to control the spread of
venereal diseases. In GWOT, prostitution has been unofficial as the U.S. military
prohibits its practice as not to offend local communities (Enloe, 2001). However,
as women have been marketed to justify this war, they have been victims while
being portrayed as the site of rescue. While Afghan women are being claimed as
respected and protected by the U.S. military, their own female and male
comrades are being sexually assaulted at alarming rates by their fellow military
members. Women’s inclusion in the U.S. military has been also marketed as
liberation, although it has been manipulated. A common argument is whether
women should be included in combat roles as a means to equality. In 2013, the
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DOD announced women would be allowed to apply for these roles, with many
advocates claiming this as a milestone of progress for women (Hawkins, 2013).
Enloe reiterates this point saying that those in military leadership have
“tried to camouflage women’s service to the military as women’s liberation”
(Enloe, 1983). This “camouflage” has distracted the public from the effects of the
foreign intervention in Afghanistan and built false notions that foreign militaries
and occupied societies are supposed to work in unison towards a common goal
of liberation. Shallow gendered descriptions of the country as feminine have
further subjugated its society’s vast identities and needs. “This negation of
“femininity” arises from the military’s masculine self definition. One of the
bastions of masculinity in a sexist society, the military constructs male identity as
being predicated on violence and combat. This stands in contrast to the notion of
women as passive, away from the battlefront. However, women are not away
from the battlefront and their lives are deeply affected outside of the liberation
discourse. Victoria Brittain says, in the introduction of her book, Shadow Lives:
Afghanistan has been devastated for its own people many times over, but most
of all in the most ideological and technological of wars…it was a war based on a
convenient myth of Afghan responsibility for 9/11. The real Afghanistan of the
shepherd boys, village wedding parties, grandmothers and babies, killed by US
bombs was visible and dehumanized in a decade of its people being used for
deadly experiments in enforcing Western power. (Brittain, 2013, p. 2)

These literatures show that liberation is a propaganda code word used to justify
entrance into a sovereign society. Women are merely falsely marketed and their
gender repackaged to further hegemonic goals as they continue to be ignored by
power structures. The actual impact of foreign militaries in base host
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relationships is obscured by this discourse and false definition and example of
liberation.
Some communities pay the highest price: their farmland taken for bases, their
children neurologically damages by military jet fuel in their water supplies, their
neighbors imprisoned, tortured and disappeared… (Lutz, 2009, p. 4)

These are the actual effects of occupation that complicate the idea that foreign
militaries and hegemonic visions bring liberation through their efforts.
Afghans mounting tensions to Operation Enduring Freedom and the newly
formed Afghan government as well as the GWOT’s attention shifting to Iraq,
supported a rise in insurgency, most notable those affiliated with the Taliban. The
U.S. eventually transitioned to changing their methods into counterinsurgency as
liberation, which proved elusive. The Afghans had been placed in a stagnant,
gendered description and dragged into this fight that by a portrayal that a foreign
force could liberate them from terrorism. When this notion did not take root, the
counterinsurgency policy claimed that their empowerment was the goal and not
pacification as these doctrines had been described during colonialism. Just as
the propaganda of liberation was portrayed as being on behalf of women, this
counterinsurgency plan claimed to be on behalf of Afghan civilians to foster a
better cooperation and relationship between them, foreign militaries and the
Afghan state and militaries, ridding the country of insurgents (Jones, 2009).

2.3 Finding a Place with Liberation and Counterinsurgency
Although the Iraq and Afghanistan interventions were both targeted during
the GWOT, they have unique histories and qualities making it at times helpful to
link them, while other times detrimental due to the tendency to symbolize them
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together. In both arenas, a recycled policy was spun through both the military
and media that in order for the United States and its allies to triumph in the
GWOT, the hearts and minds of locals would be the described goal. Once it was
clear the U.S. and North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) allies would be
staying longer than planned, a new approach needed to be established to
respond to the insurgency. “America arguably intended its forces to occupy
briefly, transform local politics in Wilsonian fashion, and then depart” (Calder,
2007).
General Sir Gerald Templer coined the term to describe Britain’s
apparently successful counterinsurgency campaign in Malaya (1948-60). He
stated, “The answer [to the uprising] lies not in pouring more troops into the
jungle, but in the hearts and minds of the people” (Dixon, 2009). In military
terminology it is better understood as counterinsurgency doctrine. Laileh Khalil
defines counterinsurgency as asymmetrical warfare by a powerful military against
irregular combatants supported by a civilian population. Troops were encouraged
to take a softer approach to encountering civilians in Afghanistan in order to gain
support for their mission. They were told that although this may result in the loss
of more American life initially, the long term effect would be overall progress and
gains in the fight against insurgents and Taliban fighters (“The New and Old” 1423). This “battle” also made for better public relations as citizens from the U.S.
and from the allied nations were showing frustration at the progress.

This

counterinsurgency method was founded in research and had been unsuccessful
for past militaries fighting insurgencies globally. As an overall understanding,
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wars of counterinsurgency cannot likely be won by foreign armies. However, top
military officials and social scientists encouraged the softer approach and
expected their service members to embrace its style (Petraeus and Amos,2006).
Commanders have disagreed that the method should be used and troops resent
it citing the confusion on whether the priority is on U.S., Afghan or human life
(Boal, 2011). This concern is compounded by their fellow service members’
deaths, perceived as a direct result in the change in policy and the frustration and
exhaustion from the thirteen-year war. The need to be more respectful to a
country that was villianized and emasculated to them in the first place additionally
makes soldiers skeptical.
The war in Afghanistan from the position of foreign troops is fought
through counterinsurgency. In this situation, foreign troops are not fighting a
traditional military but against insurgents from the local populace. In Afghanistan,
insurgents are comprised of Taliban fighters; civilian members and most recently,
allied Afghan security forces. Their reason for insubordination to the international
direction and presence ranges significantly. Counterinsurgency aims to reduce
insurgency and gain the support of the local population pursuing goals for the
reconstruction and future of Afghanistan designed by global leaders and
alliances (Petraeus and Amos, 2006). Semantically supportive of the foreign
mission is the “Battle to Win the Hearts and Minds of the Afghan People.”
General David Petraeus, of the U.S. Army, honed in and promoted this policy in
his modern take on the United States’ counterinsurgency operations in the U.S.
Army Field Manual FM-324. This publication, written in 2006, is seen as the

Sarah Cosette 28
seminal literature and a new way forward in current and future conflicts with
insurgents. Its objectives are to demonstrate to military members engaged in this
conflict how to steer the population’s support of foreign presence and goals away
from those who are attempting to overthrow foreign presence. Neither insurgents
nor counterinsurgents can “win” without the support of the population and that is
where victories are won according to this theory. This theory also creates a
trilateral equation of competing for indigenous support. This can be achieved,
supposedly, through lower impact fighting. While the initial loss of foreign military
life is expected initially, support eventually will favor the outsider and what they
have to offer the society.
Nagl, an important voice in modern military that contributed to FM-324,
says this about the report:
The doctrinal manual was built around two big ideas: first, that protecting the
population was the key to success in any counterinsurgency campaign, and
second, that to succeed in counterinsurgency, an army has to be able to learn
and adapt more rapidly than its enemies. (Nagl, 2012)

David Galula, a historical military author of French citizenry, was born in Tunisia
and raised in Casablanca. FM-324 was built on his understanding of
counterinsurgency known for such publications like the 1950s, “Pacification of
Algeria,” for the RAND Corporation. He introduces his influential report, “Counterinsurgency Warfare Theory and Practice” by saying the following about war,
“War is not a chess game but a vast social phenomenon with an infinitely greater
and ever expanding number of variables, some of which elude analysis.” (Galula,
1964, p. 9) When discussing the division in a society between insurgents and
civilians, he notes:
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The population represents this new ground. If the insurgent manages to
dissociate the population from the counterinsurgent, to control it physically, to get
its active support, he will win the war because, in the final analysis, the exercise
of political power depends on the tacit or explicit agreement of the population or,
at worst, on its submissiveness. (Galula, 1964, pg. 6)

Kilcullen, a modern influential theorist and former Australian military member,
applies the counterinsurgency as reflected in conflicts in the Middle East and
Central Asia.
Politically, in many cases today, the counterinsurgent represents revolutionary
change, while the insurgent fights to preserve the status quo of ungoverned
spaces, or to repel an occupier — a political relationship opposite to that
envisaged in classical counterinsurgency. Pakistan’s campaign in Waziristan
since 2003 exemplifies this. The enemy includes Al-Qa’ida (AQ) linked extremists
and Taliban, but also local tribesmen fighting to preserve their traditional culture
against 21st century encroachment. The problem of weaning these fighters away
from extremist sponsors, while simultaneously supporting modernization, does
somewhat resemble pacification in traditional counterinsurgency. But it also
echoes colonial campaigns, and includes entirely new elements arising from the
effects of globalization. (Kilcullen, 2010; p. 3)

In responding to Kilcullen’s reading of the hearts and minds concept,
scholar Laleh Khalili says:
This is the true meaning of the phrase “hearts and minds,” which comprises two
separate components. “Hearts,” means persuading people their best interest are
served by your success. “Minds” means convincing them that you can protect
them and that resisting you is pointless. Note that neither has to do with whether
people like you. Calculated self-interest, not emotion, is what counts. (“The New
and Old” 15)

She says that counterinsurgency is practiced through a gendered dichotomy of
the civilian as feminine and the combatant or insurgent as masculine. Also,
counterinsurgency is perceived by those in support and defiance of it as a
feminine and civilized approach to the more destructive masculine approach.
The binary categorization which forms the basis of mainstream discourses about
war, civilian (feminine) is the opposite of combatant (masculine). Moreover, we
know that the discursive practices surrounding war also reproduce extant
gendered hierarchies through the constant reproduction of a dichotomous
rhetoric of masculinities and femininities. (“The New and Old” 17)
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However, as the liberation propaganda showed us, the tendency to dichotomize
gender in hearts and minds as well explains that it continues to be the tool of
war, further reinforcing designations as understood by outsiders while ignoring
the complexities of society in Afghanistan. She goes on to explain:
A more complicated set of gendering practices occurs not at the endpoint of
application of counterinsurgency force, but at the seam of encounter between the
occupying military forces and the people subjected to counterinsurgency. This
seam is the messy interstitial space in which the cross-hatching of race, gender,
class, and empire all produce unexpected hierarchical positioning. (“Gendered
Practices” 11)

The analytical chapters (4 and 5) will illustrate the U.S. troops
perspectives were challenged and maintained these discourses of liberation and
counterinsurgency. Their experiences on the ground did not always reflect what
those in power had asked them to accomplish. While they were at the bottom of
the U.S. military hierarchy, they were placed at the top of a power hierarchy of
foreign troops based in Afghan society acting out the hegemonic mission.
However, they saw their presence challenged and had trouble accepting why
liberation was unwelcomed by so many. Their preceding descriptions of these
relationships show how conditions and confusions within these affiliations are far
outside the discourses of liberation and hearts and minds.

Sarah Cosette 31

3. Methodology
Outsiders have portrayed Afghanistan in discourse and doctrine as a war
that was described and built, won or lost through the relationships between U.S.
troops and Afghan society. United States military members serving abroad are in
a unique historical position within the context of international relations. I felt it was
a natural progression to explore this relationship from U.S. sources that
experienced it firsthand, albeit a limited scope until Afghan perspectives are
attained, to better understand the sociology of war. When developing the project,
I wanted to speak with active military members and veterans of the Afghan War.
My research site was in the United States, the troops’ home base away from the
Afghan arena from 2011 until 2012. This chapter will explain the methodological
processes involved in this research including its development, implementation,
response and analysis. The survey questions used will be provided followed by
how interviewees were chosen and what questions they would be asked. This
section will also look into who took the survey as well as reasoning for resistance
to the questioning by others.
As the surveys and interviews were being conducted, the situation in
Afghanistan was constantly changing. Headlines in the media were updating the
public and the troops back in the United States as to the progress of the war.
Just before my interview with Alpha, General McChrystal had been dismissed for
his comments in Rolling Stone magazine about President Barrack Obama and
the military efforts in Afghanistan (Wilson and Shear). Many of the interviewees
spoke of their dissatisfaction when asked about the media’s coverage and
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portrayal of troops. “I was sick and tired of hearing media reports that seemed
inaccurate, that were not the full story. I want to go and have my own story, my
own story to tell my family,” stated Bravo. The troops who took the survey, and
for those that participated in the interviews, each had a chance to tell their own
stories. Their perspectives could be recorded on a variety of topics without
outside influence or censorship providing a unique glimpse from one side of the
Afghan conflict. These insights into the minds of the troops on the ground are
important when explaining the actions and intentions of a group that usually has
no voice other than ones given to them by their government and media.
It should be remembered that these reflections are given by men and
women based on their memories when in their home country after there is space
and time between them and Afghanistan. Some of them would return in the
future while others would not, either because they had retired or would be based
in another country, part of the U.S. base expanse. When asked what was a
major concern that needed to be addressed in the current lives of U.S. troops
and veterans, an overwhelming amount brought up post-traumatic stress
disorder and said that many of them suffered it.

PTSD, as it is commonly

referred to, is defined by the Mayo Clinic online as:

“. . . a mental health

condition that's triggered by a terrifying event. Symptoms may include
flashbacks, nightmares and severe anxiety, as well as uncontrollable thoughts
about the event” (MayoClinic.com). The highest risk factor for men is combat
exposure, and this health concern has also been used to represent U.S. military
members in the public discourse. However just as gender was repackaged to fit
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a narrative of support for Operation Enduring Freedom, this issue has been used
to stereotype troops offering little context and reduces them to crazy or
dangerous. This discourages troops from seeking treatment for fear of being
stigmatized by a description that some may perceive as a weakness. If the
effects of war include PTSD for U.S. troops, then it surely there is also a feature
in Afghan society, given that Afghans have experienced wars for generations.
However, it is considered a western construct that is primarily discussed as it
pertains to troops and is void of including and discussing the health of the other
half of this base host relationship, the individuals and communities of nations in
conflict with the US who are also deeply affected by war.

3.1 The Survey
Base host politics, as they are called within international relations and
political science literatures, are complex relationships between a foreign military,
such as the U.S. and the national society where they are stationed or hosted
(Cooley, 2008, p. 18). This foreign presence and the relationship that results vary
based on numerous factors including the association and agreement between
the two or more governments involved, regions, cultures and whether or not they
are involved in a war.

Nonprobability sampling techniques were utilized to

identify the study group. Expert sampling was used to provide viewpoints from
those with actual experience with the subject matter. While viewpoints from the
general public and non-troop groups may have provided some information on the
subject, the most effective way to extract data was to go directly to the source.
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The troops surveyed would have firsthand knowledge of the situations being
questioned. Snowball sampling was also used when expanding survey and
interview participation. Contacts such as university liaisons for active and veteran
troops would refer me to other groups that might be interested in the study.
Troops were commonly in contact with other service members that they had
served with in Afghanistan. These connections would prove to be a good way of
spreading the survey to ideal candidates. The survey provided in Appendix A and
the interview questions in Appendix B were developed to offer United States
service members the opportunity to discuss their experiences in Afghanistan as
members of a foreign military in Afghan society.
I offered the survey online through the site Survey Monkey. This was an
effective tool and made sharing it incredibly convenient. The first portion of the
survey was created in order to gain background knowledge of the troops being
surveyed. Demographic information could then be used to identify patterns
between different groups within the survey information (i.e. gender, location
within Afghanistan, branch of military). General information about the types and
frequency of activities between troops and Afghans would also lay the
groundwork for this study by providing a glimpse into troop activities not typically
covered by outside sources.
The section, “Base Host Relationships & Civilian Support” was designed
to allow the troops to describe their viewpoints on a variety of topics regarding
U.S. discourses on Afghanistan. These viewpoints can then be compared to U.S.
policy and preconceived notions about Afghan civilians and society. Questions
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about positive and negative actions are presented in order to gain an
understanding of problems that arise within the U.S. troop/Afghan relationships.
This will begin to paint a picture of what issues can arise from a foreign military
presence within a community. Soldiers’ opinions on trust are questioned to gain
knowledge of where they feel allegiances lie. These answers can be used to
show how a foreign military’s presence can alter societal relations, goals and
roles within daily lives of a particular community.
The next section of the survey offers questions about the troop’s
education and training before and while they were in Afghanistan. These
questions were proposed to gauge what knowledge troops had in terms of
Afghan society and culture. This would provide a basis when analyzing their
actions with different portions of the Afghan society. It would also provide insight
into difficulties the U.S. troops might have in their interactions with civilians on a
daily basis. This information would be crucial in identifying how two different
cultures interact with each other, especially within the stressful circumstances
provided within a military setting.
A section of questions were provided for the troops to give insight to their
roles within the Afghan conflict. Rhetoric of liberation was used to mimic the U.S.
discourse of Operation Enduring Freedom (Brown, 2012). Questions were used
to determine if troops identified with this description or if they felt other
terminology towards their actions and roles were more appropriate. Troops were
also asked to describe their views and interactions with Afghan men, women and
youth. These questions were designed for the troops to counter their descriptions
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of their own roles with viewpoints of those they would be forced to interact with.
These questions were strategically placed in this section to illicit a response
about Afghan society while troops were contemplating their own roles within this
foreign society.
The

section

of

the

survey

entitled

“U.S.

Forces

Purpose

and

Responsibility” was designed to get the troops to contemplate what purpose their
deployment to Afghanistan served. It was hoped that troops would go behind
standard talking points found within typical U.S. government and media talking
points, as well as question if their presence was even needed. Questions
regarding what effects their presence had on Afghanistan were open ended as to
not direct their responses in any particular direction. Answers to many of these
questions would elicit a wide variety of responses, having many of them question
the overall motives behind their presence in the country.

3.2 Interviews
At the end of the survey, respondents were asked to provide contact
information if they wished to be contacted for personal interviews. The idea
behind the interviews were to provide troops the opportunity to add to their
responses or provide new information they felt was important that may not have
been covered by the survey. I conducted personal interviews with available
surveyed participants in the spring of 2011. Interviews conducted after this
season were acquired via phone and the Internet. Questions were formed on a
case-by-case basis for each person surveyed. If interesting points were made
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within their survey or if there were any items that needed more clarification, they
would be focused on first. I would then give the interviewee the opportunity to
expand on any subject of their interest. Interviews were conducted in person,
over the phone and through emails.
There were a few participants who could not be met in person due to
scheduling conflicts or geographical distance. These participants would be
provided an email interview that mirrored the interviews with other respondents,
asking for clarification or expansion on survey topics and allowing for the
respondent to speak to any issue that was not directly asked to them. The email
interviews were quite effective, given the length of participants’ responses. They
reflected a great range of attitudes and experiences. To try and expand on the
perceptions of the participants about the nuances of this relationship, I ended my
interviews with a creative exercise. The emails were closed with the following
questions being posed:
If you were to be the host of one Afghan person for tea, who would it be? Use
your imagination. I want you to describe to me the who, what, why, when, where,
and how of this encounter. Imagine you are unrestricted by language. No
translator needed. How would you dress? How would they? Describe this person
for me. You could have met this person or they could be based on your
knowledge or perception of Afghans. It could be an average citizen or public
figure, whoever you personally, if given the chance, would want to talk to. They
could be in any group whether devout to opposition, corruption, civil or civilian
life? Man or woman, you have the opportunity to communicate freely with this
person. What American and Afghan cultural norms would you include? What
would you talk about? What would you say about your time in Afghanistan and
interpretation of their culture? Would weapons be present? How would you sit?
Describe the scenario and your related emotions.

This exercise was designed to both add to the data collected in the
interviews and surveys, as well as provide insight into areas I had not previously
imagined. While only a few responded, it concludes the data collection with a
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creative reflection on the relationship between foreign militaries and local
communities.

3.3 Participation and Resistance
My goal was to survey and interview both veterans and active military
members about their experiences with Afghan civilians since 2001. Each of the
participants spoke of their specific time in Afghanistan, within different parts of
the country, different times in their personal lives and different times in the
discourses. This wide range of views told of experiences across many aspects of
Afghan life and military service. Some troops had years to process their time in
Afghanistan and form their opinions. Others had only been back from active duty
for a few months, emotions still fresh in their minds. This range of self-reflection
provided a well-rounded set of responses and emotions that could be used
throughout this thesis.
I designed the online survey and shared it with liaisons of various
organizations that serve and connect the military and veteran communities.
These liaisons would review the survey individually or with their staff and then
make a decision whether they wanted to share it with their members who have
served in the U.S. military in Afghanistan. If they decided they would like to
participate, I then sent them a link to be sent to their members via whatever
process they thought would be best. I also took the opportunity to meet in person
with liaisons directly when I was in their city in order to discuss my goals, project
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and the subject matter. Due to the sensitivity of the research subject matter, it
was especially important to meet with people in person when possible. The
opportunity to meet face to face helped with people’s caution about participating
and also helped develop a rapport.
I proposed the project to multiple groups with the potential of reaching
thousands of soldiers and veterans. After leaving the survey open to responses
from the fall of 2010 to the spring of 2012, approximately fifty participants in all
participated in the survey; about a quarter decided to participate in interviews.
The reaction was incredibly varied and as I proceeded to communicate further
with the participants and liaisons they shared their thoughts on the project. There
were those that who were immediately comfortable with the project and promptly
shared it with their members. Some of these liaisons and participants shared that
they felt it was an important subject and one that needed further investigation.
They acknowledged that relationships between U.S. soldiers and Afghan civilians
were incredible complex and further comprehension was needed to be beneficial
for both parties involved.

Many commented that media and academia often

overlooked it and it was an essential component of the conflict.

Many

participants stated a general distrust of media and their slanted portrayals of
soldiers’ identities and roles in wartime.
However, other groups were offended at the project’s concept and subject.
Responses ranged from claims that the questions in the survey jeopardized
American national security or that they felt like an interrogation. Some claimed it
was too soon for soldiers to be talking about the subject and their experiences.
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Some felt it would be difficult for soldiers to recount their experiences with the
high rates of post-traumatic stress disorder amongst those who served in the
military. The aforementioned groups explained these reservations and declined
to participate once they reviewed the survey. A liaison of another group told me
that he didn’t want me turning his members into lab rats to further my own
agenda or career. While on one end of the spectrum there was vocalized
resistance to the project’s theme, other groups seemed neutral or indifferent,
ignoring multiple inquiries into working with them.

Other groups seemed

incredibly disorganized and unprofessional making it a challenge to continue the
process.
One participant told me, post-interview, that the survey was the most
comprehensive and balanced survey he had seen offered to military members.
He explained that in his lengthy career as a soldier he had seen many surveys
shared. He said nearly all of them contained leading and biased questions that
allowed participants to only portray the positive aspects of the military and
conflicts as well as questions that didn’t take much thought or reflection. He
imagined I would have a difficult time having people participate since this sort of
balanced approach to researching them was foreign. The other challenge, as one
liaison explained is that soldiers and veterans feel bombarded with surveys and
often want to be left alone to live their lives and attempt to readjust to life back in
the United States. These factors and refusals ended up describing the subject in
a different way and added to its dimension not through survey statistics but
through a better understanding of the attitudes and conflicts related to
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understanding the war and the mentality of troops when they return and their
comfort in sharing these experiences.
University groups supporting the active military community and veterans
on campus were the most responsive such as Brigham Young University in Utah,
New Mexico State-Las Cruces and the University of Colorado, where I was able
to conduct interviews. The largest commitment was made through the support
and interest from the Tillman Foundation, a national group based in Arizona.
This particular group made suggestions for what would make the foundation
members and all troops feel more comfortable during the survey and interview.
They also wanted to clarify if I had any political agendas or premeditated slants
toward the subject. This foundation’s development and namesake is an important
narrative about the war in Afghanistan. Pat Tillman was a professional football
player in the United States who enlisted after 9/11, leaving his athletic career.
After he was deployed to Iraq and witnessed the intervention, he was critical of
his country’s methods and purpose in GWOT. However, he remained in the
military to fulfill his commitment and was then deployed to Afghanistan. A fellow
soldier, who was shooting his weapon recklessly when there was no threat at the
time, killed him in 2004. However, his death by “friendly fire” was masked with a
narrative of a heroic Tillman dying at the hands of the enemy while defending his
fellow troops. His family was skeptical of how the story was spun after details of
his death emerged during their personal inquiry. This revealed a cover up that
later publicly embarrassed the U.S. administration. His widow developed the
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foundation in his honor, providing active military and veterans with educational
support through the Tillman Military Scholars program (Pat Tillman Foundation).
I interviewed Echo in Las Vegas the morning after Bin Laden was killed by
American military forces in Pakistan. He had been referred to me by his fellow
Marine, Charlie, whom I had spoken to the month before. Echo was the most
expressive and excitable. His emotions deterred me from thinking he was
comfortable enough to have his voice recorded. I didn’t even ask. A main theme
for this participant was Islam and his perception of the natural violence of its
followers. He told me that although it would require him and I in some physically
compromising positions, he would teach me how to defend myself with a knife so
that I could protect myself against Muslim men when I returned to Cairo. When
storming Kabul during the invasion, he remembers that an Afghan man that was
working with the Americans raped a younger boy also working alongside
Americans in a nearby building. He could hear them and said it was the most
awful sound he ever heard. When he returned to America and saw Muslims
walking around, he wanted to go over and take those things off their heads and
beat them up. After ten years in Las Vegas, I had never seen a Muslim man with
anything on his head outside of the local mosques. I asked if he was talking
about veiled women and he said no, that in fact he felt very bad how they were
treated because of their men and religion. We continued with the interview and
shifted towards him taking the survey. He hadn’t been comfortable with taking it
alone or online and preferred to take it when he met me in person. He was
overjoyed and commented a number of times how amazing it was to talk to
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someone about Afghanistan. He never does so. I handed him my computer and
he began. After about ten minutes into the survey, in the corner of the bookstore
coffee shop, the Adhan, the Muslim call to prayer, started ringing out loud from
the speakers on my computer. My stomach dropping was instantaneous with his
freak out. He started repeating, “what is that!” He was shaking, his face showing
a range of emotions- then took his hands off the keyboard as though he had
somehow brought the muezzin to life with his typing. I quickly muted it, and
calmed him down apologizing profusely and internally rebuking myself as my
obvious amateur status as a researcher had shown. He started breathing better
and said to me with bewilderment. “Why do you have that? I know what it is, but
why?” I just paused for a second. “Two reasons. One, I work and am friends with
Muslims here in town. I like to know the prayer schedule to be respectful in terms
of when I contact them. Also, it reminds me of Cairo, which I miss and love very
much. It calms me.” I apologized again saying I didn’t even think of turning it off
as no one else uses my computer or took the survey on it before. He paused
and just simply said, “That’s really cool actually.”
surveyed and after we talked after for hours.

He returned back to the

Sarah Cosette 44

4. Liberation
Tens of thousands of U.S. troops have been based in Afghanistan over
thirteen years building a vast collection of narratives and opinions about their
experience in Afghan society. They are members of a foreign military whose
identities exist outside the norms of their “host” society while attempting to
encourage a “legitimate” Afghan government that is internationally acceptable.
Their perceptions and experiences with Afghans depict a complicated description
of this relationship. Imaginations and prospects surrounding this association were
produced in two popular discourses based on conflicting masculinities and
perceived Afghan femininity that anticipated liberation and counterinsurgency.
This chapter discloses U.S. troop’s explanation of this relationship and its fluid
nature that contradicts, challenges and reflects the expectations set forth by
those outside of the sphere of base host relationships.
Outsiders had portrayed the conflict as a war that was built, won or lost
through the relationships between U.S. troops and Afghan society. I felt it was a
natural progression to explore this relationship from sources that experienced it
firsthand, to better understand the sociology of war. My research site was in the
United States, the soldiers’ home base, away from the Afghan arena. It was
important to also understand the wider national imaginations of the American
public about the U.S. intervention. However, discussing Afghans in the U.S. was
not always welcome and opinions were often strong.
The U.S. liberation discourse, displayed through Operation Enduring
Freedom, proclaimed that U.S. troops were deployed with the purpose of fighting
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terrorists, establishing an Afghan government, and liberating its people from
oppression and poverty. The views of the troops surveyed and interviewed
reflected this sentiment. Members of the U.S. Armed Services also believed they
were deployed to the country for three reasons. 32% believed they were there to
fight the men responsible for the oppression of the Afghan society. 23% felt their
goal was to establish a stable, functioning government. While 19% responded
that it was their mission to free Afghanistan from its suffering. They saw their
presence not as one of hegemonic geopolitics, but only directly related to the
process of liberating the country and its people. This chapter will look at soldier’s
viewpoints of these three motives and the gender implications their views have
on their mission and Afghan society. From the responses of a survey to one-onone interviews, patterns and consensus emerged as U.S. troops expressed their
thoughts and attitudes. Troops’ viewpoints fall in line and contradict both
government and public discourse on Afghanistan, the reasons behind the U.S.
intervention and the good guy liberator/bad guy oppressor dichotomy.
Propaganda regarding the liberation of Afghanistan fits into a discourse of
the interventionist in a protective role as contrary to the villainous and oppressive
masculinity that was symbolized through the Taliban. “The logic of masculinist
protection appears in the claimed relationship of the United States to people
outside

the

West,

particularly

in

Islamic

countries,

ruled

by

brutal

dictatorships…The women of Afghanistan constituted the ultimate victims, putting
the United States in the position of ultimate protector” (Young, 2003, p. 17).
Propaganda that placed a heroic and protective protector between the Afghan
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villains and victims produced roles that seemed stagnant and based on the
premonition that these identities were based on absolute truths or benevolent
cross cultural respect of understanding the players and “others” involved.
Through representing Afghanistan as a female victim, these supposed truths
reduced the country to a characterization of someone needing to be saved or
liberated. “U.S. military hegemony but also international trade and financial
institutions, as well as many Western-based nongovernmental development
agencies, position them in this way as feminized or infantilized women and
children under the protection and guidance of the wise and active father” (Young,
2003, p. 19). Troops responses to these concepts represented how important
rescuing Afghanistan is to them as individuals and demonstrates how these
truths and assumptions are not absolute. The responses also show a different
interpretation from person to person and each of the respondents were impacted
heavily by the opinions they acquired through these relationships.

4.1. Being the Hero
U.S. troops were strongly convinced Afghanistan needed to be liberated
(82%). This viewpoint was strongly ingrained in U.S. doctrine and media
propaganda. It also became clear through the survey responses and interviews
that these views held strong for the U.S. troops as well. While most respondents
were neutral on the notion of it being their responsibility to bring justice to
Afghanistan, many felt the need to heed the call of their country. An
overwhelming sense of pride in their reasons for being in Afghanistan can be
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read through the viewpoints expressed. “To bring stability and civility into the
country, in particular the ruling government,” is an example of a common mindset
as to why these troops feel that they are in Afghanistan. Bravo was asked at one
point before he joined the military, “Do you want to be out here in the great war
doing something, or do you want to be lazy?” Bravo then proceeded to explain
how excited he was when he first got to Afghanistan, that he wanted to change
the world and make a difference. However, by the end of his deployment he
became disillusioned and all he could think about was getting back home. These
generalized notions of doing “the right thing” and being the “hero” are based on
good intentions albeit a simplistic view of the overall situation on the ground.
These ideals created a masculine gender role that identified the foreign military
force as the liberator, being the backbone for the U.S. troops’ motivation in their
quests. Many respondents also referred to themselves as the “good guys” as
opposed to what they called the opposition, the “bad guys.”
I think we are the good guys. We try to follow the rules; we try to do good things.
The heart of the American people is in a good place. We’ve been there 10
years… I like to think that my participation was as the good guy [who tries] to
help out a nation. (Bravo)

The liberation/oppression dichotomy placed the opposition in the role of the
oppressors. This generalized group is again seen by U.S. discourse and public
sentiment as well as media propaganda in the same light as the U.S. troops
being deployed. The opposition is made up of the Taliban, Al Qaeda, and various
fighting groups both foreign and local to Afghanistan. These groups were seen as
pushing their extreme views on the local Afghan society or subjecting the
population to harsh treatment. Mistreatment of women, unjust punishments, and
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“extreme social standards” were common rallying points against this opposition.
“The Taliban was a harsh time for Afghans, and they needed foreign support to
oust them,” says one survey respondent. This sentiment created an opposing
masculinity in the eyes of U.S. service members. Delta described these role
descriptions:
I agree that it is not good to group everyone into good guy, bad guy groups. I
don’t care what nationality he is, if he is firing a weapon at me than he is a bad
guy, that’s just the way it is…You just become desensitized to the situation. You
don’t want to think about your enemy. (Delta)

The discourse had oversaturated the connection between Islamic extremism and
Afghan victimhood. Uniform wrote, “They [Taliban] got the Koran wrong from the
little bit of knowledge they know.” Uniform felt this was based on ignorance,
further perpetuating the narrative of their little knowledge. Many troops believed
the Taliban had misinterpreted their religion and used it in an extreme fashion to
oppress their society and justify “misogyny.” The opposition, through their
negative actions, became a masculine oppressor and simultaneously an
adversary. The opposition would become the target of the troops’ mission in
liberating Afghanistan and were seen as the conflicting masculinity.
The conflict between these two roles, liberator and oppressor, were
originally thought of as clear-cut in the eyes of the U.S. troops. The opposition
had set themselves apart from the local Afghan population by their actions. This
created an assumption that most Afghans felt the same way as the U.S. troops
coming to rescue them. One might think it would be a simple deduction that if a
society was being mistreated, they would welcome anyone that could help them
overcome this problem. In some cases respondents did meet these reactions,
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“Afghans I met adamantly opposed the Taliban philosophy.” The U.S.
government had built much of their reasoning behind this notion of the United
States coming to save Afghans. At the same time, the troops reflected this notion
in their original reasons for the United States getting involved in the conflict.
Contact with opposition insurgents happened on weekly basis for most of the
respondents. The type of contact differs with this group compared to the other
groups being discussed in this chapter. While there was contact by way of
combat, there was no dialogue between opposition insurgents and U.S. troops.
Nearly all perceptions would then be formed on exposure not only with direct
fighting, but also indirectly by way of seeing firsthand the effects of these groups
on the local civilians, a group in which communication was more common.
As U.S. troops began to gain experience and have interactions with local
Afghans and opposition groups, they began to realize that their original
assumptions might not be as black and white as the media or even their own
government had portrayed them. The U.S. troops found themselves in an uphill
battle just to convince the local population that they were in fact the liberators,
there to help the Afghans. Multiple factors led to this identity crisis and gender
role confusion. Troops quickly learned that it was not easy to discern between
the local population and the opposition groups. The Taliban were made up of the
local populations and not only blended well physically and in societal roles but
also their viewpoints were founded on their surroundings and country’s history.
Since the same surroundings and history also shaped the viewpoints of the
portion of society that did not identify with the Taliban, it should not be a surprise
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that these “two” groups did not share at least some similar views. “The Taliban
mix well with the local population because they are the local population,” quipped
one respondent. As the soldiers lived on bases outside communities, the
opposition mixed with local Afghans, lived with them, and was a part of their
social sphere. The soldiers on the other hand, lived in bases outside of
communities, closed off to the people they were trying to liberate. This
disconnect would prove to be a huge hurdle for service members as their quest
to be the liberators they were promised continued. Another aspect that hampered
the troops’ mission was collateral damage to both physical life and to the societal
fabric of the Afghan population. “If our bombs landed too close to their villages,
they would work with the Taliban and give them information on our base,” cited
Mike. It would be a noted concern of troops that their role to fight the Taliban and
other opposition forces might have unwanted consequences with this oppressed
group they were trying to save. Every aspect of the troop’s presence was
scrutinized. U.S. troops were the outsiders in this country and sentiments
towards them were not as positive as troops were led to believe. While troops
believed that they were promoting good ideals and having a positive effect on
Afghan society, they also realized that the way things were being done might not
have always been the best for the Afghan society.
There are a lot of things that we changed: the voting, the rights of the women and
young girls. All those things changed for the better. So there are some good
things that happened. But then there are some bad things that happened
because we were trying to force a lot of our beliefs instead of allowing them to be
embraced by Afghans. I don't if Afghans would set up their society in the same
we would. (Delta)
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As the confidence faded after the initial invasion in 2001 and 2002, it
became clear to U.S. troops that their original perceptions and role formations
were not materializing. While in their minds they still held on to the beliefs and
values that they were on the side of “good,” there to help a people in need, they
realized that they were not always perceived that way. The Afghan population
that they came to liberate was wary of foreigners in their land, fighting around
their villages and killing members of their communities. A backlash began to form
around the presence of U.S. troops. One service member mentioned that, “Often
[the Afghan population] saw the Taliban as a heroic force that was fighting the
foreign occupiers.” Many in the communities would then proclaim, “Yes, we are
all Taliban,” showing that this was something the average citizen could now be
proud of. “If IED went off in a village,” the U.S. was blamed for the violent act.
The opposition groups wouldn’t have to commit these acts if the troops were not
there. This mindset would eventually lead to a battle over the liberator gender
role. Both the U.S. troops and their opposition counterparts would seek to lay
claim to this title in the name of defending the Afghan population.

All

experiences collected showed that the soldiers’ believed in their mission, meant
well and were not part of an imperial military.
Throughout the day, as we broke out the bricked up windows, repainted those
walls, and re-developed the building into a workable school, the local population
slowly came out to see what we were doing. It wasn’t until the children of the
village showed up, late in the afternoon, and began exploring their new school
that, in my mind, they understood the oppression was over and they were, with
the US’s help, free to live and thrive as they saw fit. (Whiskey)
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4.2. Helping Afghans Help Themselves
The next main goal of the US intervention in Afghanistan was to create a
national Afghan government. This government would also be supported through
the formation of the Afghan National Army (ANA) and Afghan National Police
(ANP) forces. There were two driving factors behind this U.S. idea. The first
notion of the U.S. policy makers was to create a “non-oppressive” Afghan
leadership that would replace the Taliban and its harsh treatment of the local
population. The second was to allow the victimized section of society that had
been mistreated and marginalized to have a voice in their future, country, and
societal laws. Within the interviews and surveys, troops were questioned both
about their initial feelings towards the formation of these groups, as well as how
these groups affected the society they were governing.
There was a common theme both among the U.S. government discourse,
as well as throughout the soldiers surveyed, that there was a strong need for the
Afghans to form a national government. As U.S. troops based their assumptions
on their own personal experiences, they felt a stable centralized government
could be formed and would govern effectively. The idea was to empower the
oppressed masses. In the eyes of the troops, this empowerment would go hand
in hand with the liberation discourse by giving the Afghan civilians the tools
needed to take care of themselves and their country after they were no longer
under Taliban control. Since one of the first priorities of OEF was to remove the
oppressive Taliban, the de facto government at the time of the invasion, it was
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apparent the next step would be to fill that void. It was also implied by the troops
that these government forces would be supported by the Afghan population. As
with the removal of the opposition forces, these assumptions would prove
challenging as roles within the society did not always fit into the United States
troops’ preconceived ideas.
After the creation of the government and ANA and ANP forces, troops
found themselves in direct contact with these groups, often working alongside
them. Weekly and daily contact was prevalent throughout the survey group in
regards to ANA and ANP forces. These interactions were primarily through joint
operations or within a training capacity. “Working joint border control operations
at the busiest border crossing from Pakistan (Torkham Gate),” commented one
respondent. Other interactions with ANA and ANP forces occurred on base both
in passing, and during off duty hours such as dining. “I enjoyed meeting them
and hearing about their lives,” one of the U.S. soldiers responded in the survey.
These initial feelings fell in line with the troops’ original lines of thinking. Afghans
were rising through the ranks of their societal hierarchies. They were no longer
just an oppressed group under the rule of a heavy-handed regime. The U.S.
troops had provided opportunities for Afghans and now they could better their
country as a whole.
Similar to the preconceived notions about fighting the oppressors, there
would be unforeseen flaws in the U.S. ideals to create a better Afghanistan. With
only limited knowledge of Afghan societal structure, troops were unprepared for
the difficulties in pressuring Afghans to adopt a central form of government. With
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a history and focus on a tribal culture, Afghans were apprehensive about
adopting a new mindset when it came to groups governing their lives:
It goes back to the fundamental focus on self preservation and the inability to
know or care (or know to care) about the government. In fact, as my platoon and
I were setting the conditions for the 1st-ever democratic elections in the history of
the country, we discovered that just about nobody even knew what a Provincial
government was, let alone what purpose it served or why it was important.
Teaching them what voting was, and how to do it was another massive struggle
against conceptual inertia. (Tango)

Not only does Tango show the struggles soldiers have within this excerpt from
his interview, but it also shows the connection between liberation and
democracy. Soldiers thought that Afghans could not be fully liberated without
having a democratic government to support their new freedoms.
When questioned whether “Afghan communities trust and support Afghan
National Army and the Afghan National Police?” 59% of the respondents felt the
Afghan communities did not trust and support the ANA and ANP. Only 12.5%
thought the communities did trust and support these groups, while the remainder
of the respondents remained neutral on the issue. 75% of respondents felt there
was no trust of the current government by civilians. Questions must be raised
when comparing these statistics with that of trust between communities and local
tribal leadership. 87.5% of respondents felt that communities did trust this more
local and historically Afghan form of government. These numbers express
disconnect between the two cultures and how they feel their societies can be
effectively governed. While this statistic points out only one discrepancy between
U.S. discourse and Afghan society, this idea of misunderstanding and lack of
knowledge of the other repeats itself throughout interactions between U.S. troops
and Afghans. “Understanding the ties between local populations and their tribal
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leaders and in depth political analysis of how these relationships work can only
help line leaders in the field who have to deal with these individuals on a daily or
weekly basis,” noted one interviewee.
While some of the problems lie within the basic differences and histories
between the U.S. and Afghan cultures, other factors led to the distrust and lack of
support for the Afghan government and its supporting forces. Soldiers noted
rampant corruption within the ranks of the newly formed Afghan groups. This
placed the Afghan population in a similar situation to that of their previous rulers,
the Taliban. It showed the Afghan civilians that the Afghan government, troops
and police forces might not be people you could trust, or would have your best
interests in mind. Like the Taliban, they may be only trying to exploit their power
for whatever they feel is best for them and not for the country as a whole. While
the new form of government may not be oppressing the society with extreme
laws or obtuse women’s rights, they were still becoming a feminized population.
The masculine oppressors had simply changed from Afghans under the label of
the Taliban, to Afghans under the label of government officials, ANA or ANP.
Again while the intentions of the U.S. troops were well placed, their shortfalls
were not lost on them. When asked what Afghan civilians need to be protected
from, many responses included the Afghan government alongside opposition
forces such as the Taliban. “Corrupt police, corrupt government, and the
Taliban,” answered one service member. “The Taliban and their own
government,” responded another. These shortcomings within the government
and forces set up by the U.S. discourse only added to the uphill battle in their
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fight to liberate the Afghan people. Similarly to the problems encountered from
fighting with opposition forces, U.S. actions were progressively being seen
negatively in the eyes of the Afghan population. This would continue to work
against their ideal situation of the troops liberating the Afghan people and instead
add to the notion that the U.S. troops were in fact the ones oppressing the
Afghan society. They had developed a new “official” Afghan masculinity and were
concerned when it didn’t match the liberating image they had made in their own
likeness.

4.3. The Liberated Population
While women became an easy rallying point for America’s westernized
culture, the troops surveyed had many opinions about all aspects of the group
they were going to liberate. The Afghan civilians were initially viewed as a
feminized society under the oppression of the Taliban and other extremist groups
within the country. They lacked basic rights, freedoms and opportunities. The
soldiers’ views would mirror that of the U.S. media and cultural perspectives;
Afghans needed to be saved.
82% of US troops surveyed either agree or strongly agree that
Afghanistan should be liberated while most respondents were neutral on whether
the Afghan people actually want to be liberated. This contradiction is a strong
indicator as to the U.S. perspective on the Afghan situation. It shows that they
feel they know what is best for the Afghan people, even if they do not. That is a
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bold statement to make about a society that one is unfamiliar with, one that will
continually haunt the troops efforts.
The amount of interaction between groups within Afghan society varied
greatly. One group in particular, Afghan women, had the least amount of contact
with U.S. troops yet elicited some of the strongest responses. Most reported that
they did not have contact with Afghan women, although many did respond to the
question; “briefly describe Afghan women’s (personality, attitude, manners, etc).”
Most responded with descriptions such as shy, submissive, reserved and
subservient. However, based on their individual experiences, views towards
women contradicted each other as well as U.S. social discourse and
propaganda. One respondent commented that, “In the part of the country I was
in, women were hardly second class citizens. They weren’t any kind of citizen at
all. They were more like livestock.” Another went on to describe that:
They served as a measure of a man’s status, were completely stripped of their
own sense of identity and self-worth, and could be severely punished (up to and
including banishment or death) for the slightest infraction of the Taliban’s gender
“norms.” It is utterly tragic to see the wholesale annihilation of the human spirit.
(Tango)

Comments like this reinforced the ideas of Afghan women as victims in the
liberation propaganda and challenged the respect of norms discussed within
counterinsurgency. However, it also fit in with the stereotypes regarding the
women challenged by critics of this propaganda.
An interviewee went on to describe women:
My sense is that women are not hidden, generally, or segregated, at least not in
the public space. I cannot speak to much extent on the traditional arrangements
in the privacy of an Afghan home; however, women are everywhere in
Afghanistan, in public: they are selling goods at markets; they are working in
offices; they are in the Afghan military and police (now); they are teachers and
leaders in their parliament. Even traditionally, my understanding is that women
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are not ostracized as they are in some more radically fundamentalist Muslim
countries, or as they were during the Taliban rule, which was atypical of Afghan
culture. (Victor)

This participant contradicts the generalized victim description in their experience
and explains it as a “western construct”:
It is hard for me to conclude that, with some exceptions, an Afghan woman
functioning in the ways I described, or, as perhaps the majority do, tending to the
home in more traditional ways – farming, cooking, and the like – are second
class citizens: I think that is something of a western construct, akin to imagining
that women in the US who choose to be housewives, home school children,
pursue or not pursue college or graduate level education, are second class
citizens. (Victor)

The media played a major role in forming the opinions of troops before
they experienced Afghanistan for themselves. While many described their
reasoning for joining the fight in Afghanistan on reasoning sold to them by media
and politics, some became exposed to the sometimes one-sidedness of the
profession.
You’re seeing many journalists but I didn’t meet a single one that didn't have an
agenda or didn't have a preconceived notion and opinion. Regardless of what
you said, this is how they would say it. (Alpha)

Delta added to questioning the motives of the media and its effect on the U.S.
thought process when rationalizing their actions.
Our culture in a sense, when it comes to war, is limited in this way. What comes
to us going into another country and taking the life, it's not that hard because
they're the enemy. Did they forget that there's a human side to that and they
have families, a wife and kids, that they were breathing a one-time? They (US
society) don't look at it that way. (Delta)

As for the actual interaction or lack thereof between Afghan women, and U.S.
troops, one respondent noted that it minimized the effectiveness foreign armed
forces would have in their goals. By not being able to speak with and hear from
women, the troops could not get a full picture of all the problems they felt needed
to be corrected. This, in turn, would lead troops to rely on what they have heard
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from media, their own government and speculation to form their opinions about
problems facing Afghan women. They also revealed that perhaps the
segregation of women, while seen as extreme, has been possibly perceived as a
defense mechanism from the number of foreign militaries that have been based
in Afghanistan. While women are often seen as victims, there is also a strong
sense of protection over their bodies. The respondent went on to say, “U.S. will
have even less effects because they do not produce offspring with the local
female population.” He said to his knowledge, he did not know of any service
members having carnal relationships with local women”. He admitted, “I am sure
it has happened but I have never heard of it personally.” I then asked if this is
difficult for soldiers, hoping he would dig deeper into the issue. He said, “No, they
didn't have a difficult time not being with Afghan women.” The respondent
believed that there was evidence of a Russian genetic legacy based on ethnic
appearance and that they, “can't even imagine the political fallout/disaster of
getting an Afghan woman pregnant.” He wouldn’t, “necessarily want to pursue an
Afghan woman, as they are all covered up, dirty and poor. It's clear the Russians
left something behind besides weapons and airfields.” The respondent believes
that the U.S. military has been very respectful of cultural norms regarding women
in Afghanistan.
All respondents reported interaction with Afghan men either daily or
weekly. The descriptions of Afghan men varied greatly from respondent to
respondent. Responses varied more when asked about men rather than women
because the responses were based on actual experience rather than
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perceptions. In the case of Afghan women, descriptions seem to be based more
on common gender rhetoric with minimal firsthand experience, while experiences
with men were more specific. Although responses varied, the most common
response was that Afghan men are proud and have a strong love of their country.
This description can be problematic for U.S. troops when identifying them as a
feminized population needing liberation. Afghan men may view this role
identification negatively and take actions to defend their masculinity, often siding
with the opposition.
Afghan society was most often described as family oriented. This idea
also works in favor of the views previously expressed in this chapter citing
reasons U.S. troops have difficulty separating opposition fighters from foreign
civilians. With strong community and family bonds, opposition fighters can easily
slip in and out of the opposition role as well as spread influence to other Afghan
civilians. This fluidity between roles benefits the opposition forces greatly over
that of their U.S. counterparts.
Troops did report some positive reactions to their presence. The most
commonly believed positive effects of U.S. troops in Afghanistan were access to
jobs and education. Some troops also reported women having more freedoms as
well due to their presence, “Women have greater freedoms, children can attend
schools, and civic utilities can function properly”. Access to aid and humanitarian
services was also brought up multiple times. When looking at the positive effects,
these items must be viewed in consideration to the overall conflict within
Afghanistan and its history. Access to jobs and education are important societal
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needs and encourage growth across all genders. However, these needs tend to
be overshadowed by more pressing issues such as safety, governing bodies and
foreign invaders. It can be deduced that until Afghanistan is more stabilized,
growth in more progressive ideals such as women’s rights will be put on hold.
As part of the survey, troops were asked a series of questions about their
level of education about Afghanistan. 94% of respondents “strongly agreed” that
U.S. forces receive education and training about their host community, society,
and culture. Answers were mixed when asked whether they received enough
training before and during their tour in Afghanistan. 57% of troops felt that more
training in cultural and social customs would be the most beneficial when
interacting with Afghans.
These ideas point out that the notion of preconceived ideas or lack of
knowledge about a people or their customs and culture could be detrimental
when trying to liberate them. Further study and training by military forces may
have concluded different gender roles and identified better societal needs from a
liberator or if a liberator is needed at all.
It would have been easy to look at these people, both combatants and civilians,
as being less than what we are and inferior. These people are survivors and
absolutely capable of taking care of themselves and solving problems, even
though their methods may be different than ours. (Victor)
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5. Hearts and Minds Discourse
As the U.S. war in Afghanistan progressed, roles changed with the
changing situation on the ground. This led to both a change in the discourse by
outside actors such as the U.S. government and media as well as with the U.S.
troops’ personal views. The initial roles of the U.S. troops being liberators,
fighting the oppressive terrorist groups and saving the Afghan civilians, had been
blurred leaving the U.S. to reevaluate their place in Afghanistan. While the main
goals of fighting terrorism, establishing a national government and providing
Afghan civilians with a better life remained, the ways in which the troops would
need to go about achieving these goals had to change dramatically. With Afghan
civilians not embracing the U.S. troops in their country or the government and
security forces they were trying to put in place, U.S. policy would need to change
its policies towards Afghan civilians. Rather than being seen as a passive group
under the influence of the Taliban or U.S. troops, they would play a more active
role. Afghan civilians would need to be convinced of the U.S. troop’s goals and
be utilized by the U.S. troops. This shift in strategy still produces the same results
of fighting terrorism and liberating the Afghan people, just through different
means. This chapter will look at the causes for the need to change strategies and
the new gender roles that would be created in the process.
Through the interview process and survey responses, troops described
what they experienced on the ground. Within these descriptions, six themes
became apparent in the process to change from a liberation discourse to the
counterinsurgency strategy of “The Campaign to Win the Hearts and Minds” of
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Afghan civilians; education/training, role confusion, money/loyalty, trust and
respect, cultural compatibility, and danger to the troops. These themes will be
discussed and analyzed from the viewpoints of the U.S. troops serving in
Afghanistan.
The U.S. military was attempting to counter these built up representations
and behavior of troops through counterinsurgency doctrine.

Symbolizing the

Afghans through a female victim had proved to be problematic and didn’t match
the range of identities and communities they had within these relationships.
Even the choice to focus on the burka and veil in Afghanistan as a sign of
progress further made this conflict about something inanimate and not human.
We need to recognize that, whatever effect it has had on the women who wear it,
the veil has also had a radical impact on our own field of vision, on our capacity
to recognize Muslim societies for something other than misogyny and patriarchal
violence. Our ability to respond, morally and politically, in a responsible way to
these forms of violence will depend on extending these powers of sight
(Hirschkind and Mahmood, 2012, p. 353).

Counterinsurgency extended these “powers of sight” and claimed through
practicing “lessons learned,” troops could move the Afghans away from the
oppressive elements of their society. Troops are conflicted by these constructs
offered in the two discourses. They are told if they exhibit these qualities when
interacting with Afghans they have the power to change the course of the war.
However, they place responsibility not just on insurgents and explain that they
witness Afghans’ civilians and members of the state apparatus who can be
apathetic to their vision or work against it even when cultural considerations are
made. This problematizes cultural considerations and a hearts and minds policy
that can make the Afghan population support a foreign mission like Operation
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Enduring Freedom and its practices.

Troops develop and make their own

constructs of Afghans based on their interactions with them just as Afghans do
the same. Gender roles and social constructs produced are not from biological
differences in foreign troops and Afghans. “Instead we see gender identities as
effects of power-laden social practices, through which cultural scripts are
produced and bodies and selves endowed with social meaning” (Coleman, and
Bassi, 2011). Both of these focal points produce opinions and interactions that
affect the relationship roles developed in this intervention.

However, the

outcome of these exchanges are heavily influenced outside of the personal
contacts had, by a myriad of considerations such as poverty and tribal affiliations
and wider base host relationships.

Even when cultural components are

explained, it needs to be put into the perspective and experience of what it is to
be a member of a foreign military. “Occasionally, Afghan women wear the burqa
because it provides protection from dust to keep the clothing clean… The burqa
also gives them privacy, allowing them to hide their identity. Unfortunately, it may
also be worn by males who wish to hide their gender identity, and occasionally by
women, with the intent of attacking coalition forces with hidden weapons or
explosives” (Murphy, 2010, p. 78). If a U.S. Culture Newsletter was produced by
Afghans explaining foreign troops to Afghans, no doubt it would be richer than
the constructs offered in the propaganda, whether in support or defiance of their
presence. It would also as this excerpt mentioned have to define the foreign
troops through how their cultural or institutional norms could be used to harm
Afghans. Afghans constructs of this intervention and relationship need to be
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understood through their lives not just their culture before the U.S. can learn how
they are a problem within this supposed solution for the country. Focusing on
culture in hearts and minds ignores the combination of culture met by foreign
presence that troubles this relationship and produces negative outcomes, not the
Afghan culture itself.

5.1 Education and Training
U.S. troops realized a necessity for education and training about the
culture and customs of Afghanistan in order to carry out the strategy so that they
not only understand what they are implementing but also how they are going to
proceed within the foreign culture they are placed. The idea of education and
training was brought up in the surveys and interviews to see if they felt they had
the proper knowledge and skill sets to carry out the discourse they were being
asked. In the early stages of the conflict, U.S. troops’ skills were primarily based
on fighting terrorism and combat situations. As the war progressed and the
strategy changed to the hearts and minds campaign, the troops were asked to
take a new approach. With this new approach came new roles for most of the
servicemen and women. This transition asked them to step outside of their
combat roles and interact on more personal levels with Afghans. This led me to
ask them questions to see if they felt they had enough education and training for
this new role.
88% of troops believe that the campaign to win hearts and minds is
important. Only 50% believed the Hearts and Minds Campaign worked well while
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they were personally deployed in the country. When asked what they thought
could help improve the effectiveness of the hearts and minds campaign, 78% felt
that more non-military efforts would be effective. This shows the troops
realization that although they were a fighting force, they would need to step
outside of their primary roles.
Troops typically get trained to fight, and it was apparent through the
surveys and interviews that these troops were in Afghanistan under the primary
purpose to fight terrorism. As the original liberator role was not as effective as
those in command of the U.S. forces would have liked, the strategies were
adapted. The Hearts and Minds Campaign would take the civilians out of their
oppressed role that previous discourses had placed them in and instead utilize
their help in liberating their own country. This change in discourse placed the
success of the missions on both parties working together. For these groups to
work effectively common knowledge of each other’s roles in the conflict, cultural
norms, and way to communicate would be necessary.
97% of troops felt that it is important for U.S. forces to receive education
and training about their host community, society and culture. Responses were
mixed on whether or not they felt they received enough education and training
before and during their tours in Afghanistan. The most common area of
education desired by troops was to have more knowledge of the social and
cultural customs they would have to interact with. Many troops reported that not
understanding the culture reflected poorly on the troops and made their job to win
the hearts and minds of the Afghans much harder.
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Sierra described situations where lack of language skills led to interesting
interactions with Afghans. “Since there is usually little verbal communication due
to the fact that we don’t speak the same language, there is a charades dance
and that always accompanies these situations.” This becomes a disadvantage
when trying to express the goals and reasoning for U.S. troops being in
Afghanistan to Afghans, but also day-to-day activities such as buying good from
a local bazaar:
We didn't really get information on how to interact with them [Afghans]. There are
social faux pas made that would be viewed as offensive because we didn’t know
any better (greeting with the wrong hand, etc). We weren’t taught even how to
say hello or anything. Most of the troops are small town and not even familiar
with the concept as to how foreign interactions can be construed as rude or
offensive even if you mean well. (Sierra)

It was also noted that while many positive things were being accomplished for
the civilian population, the good intentions were getting lost in translation as the
result of mediocre relations.
When troops were asked what the best action they could take to better the
relationships with Afghan civilians, the most common response concluded that
troops must “learn more about their culture and try to educate them [Afghan
civilians] as to what we are doing in their country.” Some responses focused less
on how Afghan civilians felt and more on how troops could accomplish their
goals, noting that it was “Important for soldiers to learn about culture in order to
accomplish soldiers’ goals not necessarily out of any respect for afghans.”
Foxtrot explained his views on the differences education made between the
ranks of U.S. troops:
Higher-ranking officers are able to relate to the situation and Afghan civilians a
little bit better because they are trained to see the bigger picture. What makes
being in Afghanistan and trying to fulfill your role is that your first and foremost
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concern is that you want to get home safe at the end of the day. If I have to kill a
civilian or two to make that happen, as the lowest ranking soldier, I can deal with
that. (Foxtrot)

This experience shows that differences in rank and training played a role in an
individual’s actions. Comments such as these show a tough transition for troops
in sharing their role as a liberator with the Afghan population.
Reactions to the survey and interview questions leads to the belief that
troops must gain knowledge of a society in order to interact with it successfully
and efficiently. Basic understandings of customs and language would help troops
not only accomplish their missions but allow the host population to have a
chance to understand what the troops are there to accomplish. This richer
interaction might lead to less stereotyping of cultures and individuals on both
sides of the conflict, allowing true evaluations of progress made to those not in
the field who are determining future policies.

5.2 Role Confusion
As mentioned in the previous section, troops underwent a role change as
counterinsurgency strategies were altered based on results on the ground.
Troops went from a liberating force there to save the oppressed Afghan society
from their terrorist oppressors to a group that now had to work with the Afghan
civilians and treat them as equals. Not only did they need to work with the Afghan
population, but they also had to convince the Afghan population that they should
work with the troops. The Hearts and Minds Campaign had become a tug of war
battle with the opposition over the acceptance and support of the Afghan
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population. This new assignment thrust U.S. troops into a role they did not
initially prepare for:
What was abundantly clear to us, though, was that our large cumbersome
conventional Army was not well suited for the long-term smoldering campaigns
we found ourselves in… So, while the bullets were flying and the roads were
exploding, our military began transforming—in a process that still continues. It’s
been a complete restructuring. (Tango)

Their reactions and struggles can be seen through the conversations presented
in the surveys and interviews.
The change in strategy came as a shock to most troops interviewed. They
did not feel that their job in Afghanistan was to befriend the Afghan community
but rather to physically fight terrorism. Foxtrot noted that he and his colleagues
were in Afghanistan to fight. “The Army found itself having to build civil
institutions. The troops didn’t like that, and they didn’t join the Army to do that. It
isn’t what we were trained to do.” While actions such as befriending the Afghan
community and building civil institutions was meant to fight terrorism by
empowering the civilians to not have to rely on the Taliban anymore, U.S. troops
preferred more direct methods.
The troops, however, did see the reasoning behind the change to a
counterinsurgency strategy even if they were unsure if the strategy was possible.
Only 55% of troops interviewed believed that it is possible to win the hearts and
minds of the Afghan people. One would expect this number to be higher in order
to have a chance of this counterinsurgency strategy working. U.S. forces were
the policy makers’ eyes and ears on the ground. Their reports would be the
influential factor in shaping policies. If the strategies were indeed based on the
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troop’s experiences, then there had to be another reason for such low confidence
towards the Hearts and Minds Campaign. The responses within some of the
interviews leads us to believe that this disconnect between being a fighting force
and that of a humanitarian force brought on an identity crisis for many. The idea
that troops trained for combat would now be trying to sell their case for being in
Afghanistan to its people seems absurd. Troops were now being asked to
provide aid, education and training, build schools and provide basic goods to the
Afghan population:
We taught their military different tactics, techniques and procedures, helped them
bring water and electricity to villages that didn't have it before, helped build
schools with NGOs and brought clothing and shoes to remote villages. Hopefully
to set a good example and show them that U.S. soldiers were not all evil
infidels... (Delta)

U.S. troops accepted this new mission and performed it to the best of their
abilities, but even with these best efforts the question has to be asked whether or
not the troops were the correct group for the task. One respondent felt that only
5% of the time his training as a soldier was needed in his activities in the country
and that the other 95% of the time a different set of skills and training would be
needed. Troops were also split as to whether or not more or less combat with
insurgents would help win the hearts and minds of Afghans. More often than not
troops felt more aid to the country was the answer. An overall analysis of the
data and responses reveal that most soldiers had the original liberator mindset
from before their tours of duty or from the early stages of it. These preconceived
notions or first impressions would seem nearly impossible to break free from
leading to role confusion when it came time to switch to the hearts and minds
strategy.
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Constant fighting with opposition groups would lead to this role confusion
as well. As stated previously, opposition groups mixed well with the local
population or were even a part of the population. Troops would need to enter
communities with the hopes of gaining trust and respect of the local population
knowing that some of these same people could be plotting against them. This
constant struggle to separate friend from foe while trying to engage the
population respectfully and constructively almost seems impossible.

Many

recognized this dilemma and took the approach that it was the Afghans
responsibility in the end to liberate their own country. Answering one survey a
question, a respondent explained:
Now, after a decade, we are making significant progress helping the Afghans key phrase, "Helping the Afghans" - build the security capacity necessary to
protect their people from the internal threat (Taliban resurgence)…helping the
Afghans bring their own stability and security. So, we are providing now more
than ever the opportunity for the AFGHAN people to succeed.

Many troops towards the end or after their deployments began to make this
dissociation from their earlier roles. They noted that they were no longer the
liberators but rather providing the tools necessary for the Afghans themselves to
become the liberators. Ultimately most troops reflect back on their roles in
Afghanistan

with

contradicting

statements,

proud

of

what

they

have

accomplished, yet unsure of which accomplishments helped the Afghan society
or whether it would leave a lasting impression on the population.

5.3 Money and Loyalty
When asked what the best action U.S. troops can take to better their
relationships with Afghan civilians, one respondent replied, “Stop paying for
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everything…always be respectful.” The hearts and minds strategy is based
around the idea of building relationships. Relationships must be formed between
the troops and the Afghan population that is stronger than that of the relationship
between the opposition group and the Afghan population. The leading group with
the strongest relationship will command the loyalty of the population. Many of the
troops surveyed noted key behaviors of the Afghan society that made forming
lasting and loyal bonds difficult for either side. These behaviors and patterns can
be analyzed within the constructs of role formation and progression while relating
back to the hearts and minds discourse.
Afghans have been in a state of constant struggle over their country with
both internal and external forces for centuries. This lack of stability has turned
them into persons of opportunity, taking advantage of opportunities as they arise
while rarely looking at the long-term solutions. This mindset is a product of their
environment and they project it onto this conflict just as they have in the past.
The U.S. forces assumed that Afghan civilians would see the long-term benefits
of the troops’ invasion and help in reducing the grip of the oppressive opposition.
As policies shifted towards the hearts and minds doctrine, U.S. troops needed to
engage Afghans and convince them to help and support the troops’ mission.
One direct way to do this was through the use of money. Troops could pay for
the support of the population by offering rewards for information or provide
paying jobs with steady incomes. However, problems arose with this line of
thinking. Troops reported that while paying for the support of the local population
did have short-term benefits, it did not create a lasting bond. They told of stories
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of the local population helping U.S. troops one day and opposition groups the
next:
They need to stop playing both sides. They are getting paid by us to perform
duties for us, and allowed privileges that end up giving them information that they
then end up sharing with enemies and screwing us over…They need to not take
advantage of the situations. (Sierra)

These notions expressed by Sierra represent questionable practices by the U.S.
forces and policy makers. The idea that Afghans can be bought and controlled is
a strong statement of a masculine force over a civilian population. The Afghans
can be seen as trying to make the best of the situation they are being put in by
the U.S. policies. Their actions can be seen as not as taking advantage of the
U.S. troops but rather a reaction to the policies forced upon them.
When asked what the troops feel is the worst action Afghan civilians can
take that would result in harming the relationship with U.S. troops, one
respondent noted that Afghan civilians shouldn’t “continue to play both sides of
the fence and cooperate with the Taliban.” This notion of loyalty did not seem to
sit well with the troops. Possibly due to the sense of loyalty and pride engrained
in them through their service, troops struggled with the lack of loyalty when it
came to the Afghan population. Troops felt they were there to help; Afghans
should realize that and do the right thing. If that didn’t work they would simply
hire the Afghan civilians with the idea that they would be loyal to their job.
Troops would realize that Afghan loyalty, “could only be rented, not bought.”
In the interviews, Foxtrot expanded on the idea of Afghan civilians
supporting both sides. He explained that while the U.S. troops are in Afghanistan
they can provide some benefits. Over the long term this might not be the case:
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Afghans asked: Why are you [U.S. troops] here, are you going to be here
tomorrow? I had a hard time with that myself, actually developing a relationship
with them. They want to know are we going to be here tomorrow. If I work with
you, are you going to be here when someone threatens my family? In a larger
cultural sense you destroyed our government and our civil institutions, are you
going to stay here and rebuild? (Foxtrot)

He went on to explain that the aid work being done has the same effect as
paying Afghans for their services. All of the benefits that U.S. troops can provide
Afghans are temporary. “They'd rather have the medical attention than not, but if
that's the only time they see you for 6 months... They still have to live in their
communities for the rest of the year.” This disconnect from the troops way of
thinking is an example of how roles created by people not experiencing the
conflict can negatively affect those involved. A proper study of Afghan culture
may have revealed some of these issues prior to implementing policies with little
chance of success.
Another aspect of loyalty comes about with the physical living
arrangements among the troops, opposition and civilians. The troops lived on
bases built on Afghan land, while the opposition lived within Afghan communities.
One interviewee brought up the notion that, “If the Taliban is supporting a village,
then the villagers will likely support the Taliban.” The opposition forces would
have constant contact and play a bigger role in the daily lives of Afghans than
that of troops whose interaction would be limited to missions entering and exiting
communities. This can be analyzed to show that the group with the most contact
with the civilians will have the most influence over them. Stronger relationships
will be formed and their ideals will be more easily sold to the population. One
respondent pointed at that the local civilians “side with the Taliban. They have a
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choice of what they want; many civilians seem to pick the side that they feel is
going to win the fight.” This shows that opposition groups have a great influence
over the population they live with. Therefore, troops are at a disadvantage when
building relationships with Afghan civilians and continue to struggle for their
support and loyalty.
The last aspect of money and loyalty that can be gained from the insight
of the troops’ responses is that of corruption. U.S. troops were quick to point out
the waste of resources and money on many different levels. Local officials within
Afghan government positions that were appointed by U.S. troops were a main
source

of

frustration

with

the

troops

in

regards

to

their

corruption.

Mismanagement of aid projects was also a topic of discussion. While troops
reported trying to handle these situations as best they can, in most cases they
have little recourse to these actions. These types of issues further strained the
relations of U.S. troops and Afghan civilians. If the civilians could not trust the
U.S. forces, how were they supposed to work together? One respondent would
have liked Afghan civilians to:
Be more honest with us about sources of local corruption and what local
development requirements are. But after 10 years of U.S. waste, poor project
management, and engendering corruption ourselves (while contributing to the
cycle of violence that they cannot escape from), I don't see this happening - they
have no incentive to do any of that.

This interview shows the strain on troops to build relations with Afghan civilians
and win their support and loyalty towards the U.S. cause. One of the troops
noted that “hearts and minds doesn’t stop insurgency, it tries to convince the
population to stop the insurgency.” While this notion of how the discourse is
meant to work is not lost on troops, they realize that the position they are put in
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or have created themselves, puts them at a disadvantage when in competition
with opposition groups.

5.4 Trust and Respect
The success of the hearts and minds campaign is heavily influenced by
the relationships formed between U.S. troops and Afghan civilians. A major
component brought up by the respondents in building these relationships was
trust and respect. Trust and respect relates both ways in the relationship of U.S.
troops and Afghan civilians while having a direct effect on the relations with the
opposition groups. Through the survey and interview questions, it was analyzed
that the troops felt strongly that they should be able to trust and respect the
Afghans just as much as the Afghans should trust and respect the troops.
U.S. forces originally came to Afghanistan with the hopes and
assumptions that the Afghan civilians would welcome them and support them.
This notion of being liberators helping the Afghans would garner trust and
support out of the sheer act of troops fighting for the rights of the less fortunate
population. After it became apparent these earlier notions would not come to
fruition

and

the

trust

and

support

would

have

to

be

earned,

the

counterinsurgency strategy was changed to reflect this. The Hearts and Minds
Campaign was built around the idea of gaining the support of the local population
and with it the trust and respect that would follow.
Troops were asked whether or not Afghan communities trusted and
supported U.S. military forces with two common themes resulting. The first theme

Sarah Cosette 77
can be seen as a result of Afghans history with foreign invaders and occupiers.
As one respondent noted, “It is difficult for the Afghans to put up with the
sustained presence of foreign troops in their country.” In an interview with one of
the troops they reported the idea that most Afghans, “will fight whoever is seen
as an occupier.” Since most opposition groups were part of the Afghan society in
some form they would not be labeled as occupiers. As for the U.S. forces, which
built bases on Afghan land, conducted missions within their communities, and
had foreign customs and language, it would be easy to see how they quickly
became occupiers in the eyes of Afghans. With this label to fight against, it would
be much harder for troops to win the hearts and minds of the local population
over that of the opposition groups. One of the troops compared this idea to the
notion of how the U.S. would feel if Afghans had invaded the U.S. Would
Americans not be wary of the foreigners not matter how good the Afghan
intentions were? Charlie asked, “… and how it would be if they came over and
kicked our doors down? It would take a lot of effort and time for them to know
how to work with our hearts and minds.”
The second theme, and probably the most prevalent through all aspects of
the research conducted, was the negative effects of harming the civilian
population, life or property, though military efforts against the opposition. This
notion of harming the Afghan civilians U.S. troops were trying to protect, struck a
chord with the survey respondents. Delta added his thoughts in losing trust with
civilians and the repercussions of this:
They could get one US soldier and kill 20 or 30 civilians, that's their mentality.
That is a hard thing because whenever this happens it doesn't matter how
friendly we are with a village, as soon as they get the first casualties, especially
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children and women, they don't like you very much anymore. You become the
enemy because of who you are and what you represent. (Delta)

When asked what the worst action troops can take that would result in harming
the relationships with Afghan civilians, the most common response was,
“Collateral damage of persons and property.” Many troops noted how hard it was
to gain the respect of the civilians when they were kicking down their doors in
search of opposition forces. Alpha retold accounts of troops’ smallest actions that
had negative effects on building trust and respect from Afghans. “I saw guys
throwing trash out of the convoys. Instead of throwing it in trashcans, they would
just dump it out the ground. So their [Afghan’s] perception of us must be very
negative, for we are very dirty, we are very disrespectful.”
It can be seen through this study that while the official discourse had
changed to a hearts and minds strategy, liberation tactics were still in use. The
use of force to combat insurgents while trying to provide aid to civilians may look
good on paper, but in reality was difficult practice due to the opposition being so
heavily entrenched with the local population. Foxtrot noted that small gestures
can go a long way in gaining support of Afghans, even in less than ideal
situations:
It is especially embarrassing to the man of the house to bust his door down and
search his home and family. …there are ways to handle it properly, certainly a
public apology in front of the household if they didn't turn out to be anything is
fairly effective if it's done right. Also, if you compensate them for the door you
may have broken might help as well. (Foxtrot)

These deeds can surely help in trying to make the best of mistakes, but they do
not help in the overall disrespect of foreign troops occupying the Afghans land. If
troops were fighting insurgents, most certainly it would have negative effects on
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some portion of the civilian population. Any effort to win their hearts and minds
after these actions would most certainly prove futile.
At the same time, troops are struggling to win the trust and support of
Afghans; troops feel the need to trust the civilian population as well. One of the
soldiers mentioned that, “both sides of the fights (U.S. forces and the opposition)
used civilians in the fight.” In order for either side to be effective they must be
able to trust and build respect with these civilians. As mentioned in the previous
section on money and loyalty, many of the troops felt that Afghans played both
sides for various reasons. This led to distrust among the troops in using civilians
for support and information. The distrust then led to a loss of respect for Afghans
as a whole for some of the troops. As a result of these reactions, relationships
between U.S. forces and civilians would suffer. It could then be analyzed that this
produced a feedback effect that diminished relations between these groups. As
soldiers lost trust and respect, they would then tend to interact with Afghans less.
This would allow the opposition to play bigger roles in the Afghan civilians’ lives,
swaying them more towards the cause of the opposition. This in turn leads to
more distrust and the pattern continues.
Ultimately, one soldier summed up the trust and respect between troops
and Afghans, asking how can there be trust with “Civil strife, accidental deaths,
and the galling image of foreign troops present in one's country.” Soldiers realize
that good relationships are the cornerstone to the hearts and minds strategy;
however, they also realize that even though the U.S. might have more military
might than the opposition, winning on the battlefield can have negative effects on
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with a civilian population. In the end, “Counterinsurgency strategy is about
commitment, the biggest guy doesn’t always win, the smaller opposition side can
be more convincing.”
Another aspect of loss of trust and respect between troops and Afghans
came from their daily interactions when working and living together. Issue of
troops treating Afghans as second-class citizens were noted by a number of
interviewees:
So the Afghans clean the restrooms there [on an unnamed U.S. Base]… And
they [U.S. troops] were disgusting, they wouldn't flush the toilets and they were
just being huge messes, if you know what I mean, daily. If I was an Afghan
person cleaning up after these American, Afghan and NATO forces every day,
day after day, and there was crap everywhere, and he didn't respect the most
basic function of life that way… I don't know what I would think of us [U.S. troops]
because it is disgusting. These people [U.S. troops] don't do these things in the
United States. Part of it was just trying to be mean… (Bravo)

Encounters like this were sure to leave a lasting negative impression on the
Afghans working on the U.S. bases and ultimately taking these experiences back
to the communities they lived in.

5.5 Cultural Compatibility
U.S. forces entered Afghanistan under the idea that they are liberators.
Afghans and even some U.S. troops see the ongoing campaign as occupation.
What can be agreed on by both sides, according to the troops, is that there is a
huge cultural divide between the United States and Afghans. This was seen
through the troops views in three areas; troops appearance, class discrimination,
and governing styles. In each of these areas troops pointed out divides that
would negatively affect their relationships with Afghan civilians and their goals of
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counterinsurgency. After their deployments and experienced express the need
for U.S. troops to simply, “leave the country and give them back their own way of
life.”
When asked what the best action U.S. troops can take to better the
relationships with Afghan civilians, one respondent wanted to make clear that
troops not forget that, “we [U.S. forces] are guests in their country.” This idea of
U.S. troops as guests was then analyzed against the reaction some troops had
against the appearance of U.S. troops. As troops are deployed in the country,
they wear military uniforms, carry weapons and drive armored vehicles. This
combined with living in fortified bases creates an ominous presence to those who
must now live with it. It can be deduced that any population, Afghans included,
would have trouble welcoming such a sight in their communities. This scene
most likely would put a population on the defensive based on first impressions.
Combine this with a lack of communication due to language barriers and different
cultural mannerisms and customs and it can be assumed that Afghans would
tend to trust their own people, oppressors or not, over U.S. troops.
The next aspect of cultural compatibility, as it relates to how U.S. troops
related to Afghans, is class discrimination. When asked what negative effects
U.S. presence can have on Afghanistan, one respondent answered, “Some
soldiers…treated civilians as lower class because their culture is different than
ours.” While not asked this directly, most troops interviewed alluded to the fact
that they did not have much experience with cultures outside the ones they were
brought up in. This lack of experience and limited education and training on
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foreign culture, as mentioned previously, combined to leave troops at a
disadvantage when asked to interact and relate with local populations. A
common response to not fully understanding someone’s culture is to treat them
as if they are not on the same level as you. Troops’ views of a rural Afghan
lifestyle were sometimes construed in terms of “lower class”, “oppressive towards
women”, and “poor.” These views can inhibit relationship building on both sides
of the table. Troops may not come into Afghan communities with an open mind or
feel that Afghans are on the same level as them, whereas Afghans might
become defensive towards negative or disrespectful views towards their culture
or societal values:
The treatment of women and children was a very big shock to me because I have
children of my own and it was tough seeing them treated as lower than a dog.
The women just had no say in anything. I guess it was getting better as time went
on but it wasn't quite what I expected. You go to another country and you expect
to be in the United States no matter what. They (The US government and media)
should tell us you're going to see tough situations and you cannot do anything
about it; you just have to let it happen… I realized I'm in another country and
these are their laws. Even if they are totally different than ours I still have my
beliefs. (Delta)

The last and most common cultural compatibility issue brought up by
troops surveyed was that of governing styles. Troops quickly realized that
Afghans did not respond well to the U.S. system of central government. They
explained that Afghanistan was broken up into many cultures and tribes that had
few common ideological goals or histories. As troops began building a
government for Afghans and placing community members in positions of power,
allegations of abuse of this power along with corruption became common. This
plan to make Afghans conform to U.S. standards had a negative effect and
caused a backlash towards troops. One of the troops surveyed explained:
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Any positive effects will likely be undone when we leave. Government will
implode because of corruption. We've forced democracy on a culture that isn't
ready or willing to accept democracy. We have cultivated a whole new
generation of potential insurgents and terrorists.

This analysis of the situation falls in line with other analysis within this thesis;
cultural differences can block the formation of relationships and that any actions
pushed upon a cultural based on preconceived or not fully understood ideals can
lead to pushback against the ideals and those making the assumptions.

5.6 Danger
As a result of the Hearts and Minds discourse, troops would be limited to
strict criteria as to when they could engage Afghans with force. This lead to
uneasiness within the ranks as troops felt it tied their hands in possible life
threatening situations. This added danger became a deterrent to troops engaging
with civilians.
As a result of this added danger, the majority of troops felt more troops
and U.S. bases would help with the hearts and minds strategy by making it safer
for troops to interact with local populations. This, however, would be in direct
conflict with previous statements about troops being an imposing force over
civilian populations. It was noted that troops in uniform and bases built near
communities created distrust and resentment as troops would be viewed as
occupiers rather than liberators. Now, due to the hearts and minds
counterinsurgency strategy, troops would be forced to make a decision between
their safety and liberating a foreign country. One participant, Alpha, described
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how the dangers of IED’s and the perceptions of those that placed them changed
his attitude towards the hearts and minds campaign:
After almost getting blown up I thought it was much more important to appear that I
trusted those people that I was around, so that they didn't feel that they needed to kill me
or would want to kill me. (Alpha)

Golf responded with his own take on the situation:
It is easier to agree with the strategy when the hearts and minds don't shoot back and to
be gentler with the civilians when you don't have to deal with the civilians and don't worry
about getting shot or blown up. (Golf)

For the troops, their own personal safety came first, as would be expected.
However, it is surprising that a strategy would be formed that would place them in
this dilemma in the first place.
Another aspect of dangers to troops affecting their ability to efficiently
employ the hearts and minds strategy is the idea of Afghans helping themselves.
One respondent noted that, “where U.S./NATO troops have positive interaction,
we are having success in combating terrorists.” Troops commonly felt that
positive interactions would lead to better relationships with civilians. This would
allow troops to share some of the roles and dangers when fighting the opposition.
Foxtrot added to the danger discussion by describing how the ANA and ANP
forces helped offset problems faced by U.S. troops. “The Army (ANA) is a
reasonably respected institution in Afghanistan and the police (ANP) are
becoming better,” noted Foxtrot, “Actually engaging with the enemy wasn't a
problem. They never showed cowardice.” Any additional help from Afghans took
U.S. troops out of dangerous situations. This could free up troops from blame
during combat operations and allow the troops more of an opportunity to carry
out operations focused on building a better report with Afghans.
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When asked what troops felt the best action Afghan civilians could take to
better the relationship with U.S. troops, one respondent wanted Afghans to
“report information of enemy activity and become actively involved in improving
their own security.” This role sharing, ideally, would prevent troops from being in
dangerous situations. It would also mean that the troops could achieve the goal
of handing over all responsibilities of combating operations to the Afghan
communities themselves.
Ironically, this would be a similar situation as to how the Taliban, labeled
by the U.S. as one of the main opposition groups, came into power. The Taliban,
a group made of mostly Afghans, wanted to police their own country combat the
oppression of foreign fighters and local warlords. The U.S. still hopes its own
style of government formed in Afghanistan will take root and allow for a more
moderate governing of its people. However, one of the troops interviewed noted
that, “Afghanistan is dangerous and Afghans are experts at insurgency.” Only
time will tell if the current Afghan government can hold on to power after the U.S.
troops leave, and if they fail, who will take their place.
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6. Reflections
As the thesis concludes, a final analysis will be given tying relevant
historical facts, prior literature and as well as current discourse and policies to
that of troop’s experiences in the Afghan conflict. These connections will help
add to the discussion of problems that arise from foreign intervention and
imperialistic pursuits under the guise of liberation and counterinsurgency.
This thesis offers the diverse and synonymous experiences U.S. troops
have with Afghan society. They are actors and characters in propaganda and
policy discourses claiming liberation and the battle for Afghan hearts and minds.
Their identities are shaped through western public imaginations and experiences
while based as foreign others in Afghanistan promoting a hegemonic vision. I
wanted to locate U.S. service members’ perceptions as participants in this war
and their relationship with Afghan society. Through focusing on their descriptions
of the roles and groups involved in this relationship, I offer an analysis of the
gendered nuances and power relationships expected in the propaganda and
policy. Expectations put forth in the discourses are both reflected and challenged
in participant’s narratives.
The U.S. troops surveyed overwhelmingly believed it was their duty to
perform missions assigned to them by the U.S. military in Afghanistan. They did
not see their presence as one to foster geopolitics or gender justice but instead
to give freedom to a people who they described as not always welcoming
towards them. Their shared experience was being the foreign military other in
Afghanistan during different years with varying responsibilities garnering different
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proximities and relationships with Afghans. As this project focused on the
relationship with Afghan society and the described roles and expectations in the
discourse, it only offers the U.S. perspective which is limited in understanding the
complex dynamics of the associations. Overall they agreed it was a complicated
affiliation where they believed in their purpose as liberators while being defined
by Afghan society as occupiers. While my explanation of the discourses show a
supportive characterization of troops purpose and roles in Afghanistan, they
perceived their portrayal in the media to be shallow, unfair and stereotyped. This
builds upon the idea that Afghan society was objectified in a superficial fashion
through a gendered dichotomy, obscuring complex systems and identities.
I asked those surveyed to describe their perceptions of Afghans and
relationships with their society. The groups defined in the intervention and
discourses reflected roles based on the vision and expectations of hegemonic
strategy. The troops reflected as part of the research on themselves as U.S.
service members as well as, Afghan civilians, insurgents and the government
and security forces.
Afghan civilians while portrayed in the propaganda as victims, were only
sometimes referred to as such by participants. Instead, this description
complicated the static narrative of the portraying the society through the
feminine. Often they were called survivors whose actions were thought of as
influenced by a combination of politics and ignorance. Sometimes narratives
further objectified the people through an infantilized description claiming Afghans
were helpless without foreign support. Many participants cited past militaries
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occupations in Afghanistan is what had led to their present society, impacting
them in a negative way. However, these militaries were often seen as dissimilar
interventions. U.S. troops perceived them to be based in Afghanistan to support
Afghans, not for the direct benefit of the United States. Respondents were
divided whether or not the people wanted the support of the U.S. troops. Their
presence, while providing some opportunities for women, also exposed that their
“restrictive” norms could not just be attributed to Taliban, but Afghan society and
culture. Afghan civilians were often described as proud with a strong sense of
family and community. U.S. troop presence at times shamed these men through
their mission and combat. While troops believed they themselves reflected
identities of good guys there to help, they knew very well that Afghans often
didn't agree. They also were confounded with the predicaments that while
Afghans suffered before their invasion; their presence also brought fighting and a
heavy toll on Afghans lives and security. In addition, they could complicate the
lives of civilians, because asking for their assistance could put them in further
danger. Many claimed that Afghans loyalty could only be rented not bought.
Since the hearts and minds doctrine placed a shared responsibility of fighting the
insurgency between civilians the state and foreign troops, a shared commitment
was expected. However, civilian allegiances to troops were as neutral as they
were often towards insurgents. Many explained this as a survival technique by
the Afghans, albeit a frustrating one in the eyes of U.S. troops, as it hindered
their vision for success. Loyalty went two ways, and the troops claimed Afghans
wanted to know how loyal the occupation would be to the people so they could
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also hedge their bets. Civilians have been used by both sides and assisted the
hegemony and insurgencies at the same time.
Troops’ perceptions of the insurgency were fairly synonymous with both
the propaganda and policy discourses. Nearly all descriptions were about their
oppression and they were clearly defined as the enemy and “bad guy.” They
sometimes disagreed with the propaganda that perceived the opposition as
backwards or stupid, saying that this didn't give them credit for their tactical
abilities. Respondents said civilians were neutral towards the insurgency due to
this group’s brutal tactics carried out to coerce support. This group probably had
the most superficial description offered by U.S. troops and the least amount of
communication with them. This group, and the perceptions of them, further
reinforced the troops’ perception of themselves as the obvious good guy against
this conflicting masculinity. These participants discussed asymmetrical tactics
used by the insurgency such as blending into the civilian population. They felt
that this was unfair and that overall the enemy used unconventional tactics that
were difficult to compete against a large traditional military. Ironically, they did not
see or comment on how the force of international troops handed down on the
country was also used asymmetrically in the Afghan arena.
Participants were most confused by their relationship with and identity of
the Afghan government and security forces. The discourses had claimed that
those within this role were partners in Afghan liberation and state-building, and
therefore wanted a legitimate country with freedoms for its people. However, the
troops described rampant corruption within this group based on their standards
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and were unsure if this group was a healthy power structure for the Afghan
people. In both discourses they had been told that this group was the Afghan
face of the good guy role. Through this relationship there was often distrust. They
also heavily agreed that Afghan civilians did not trust or support this group. This
is problematic for them since this was supposedly the people who would be
taking over the country once foreign forces exited. Local tribal leadership on the
other hand was seen as the best means of a system that works for the people.
The troops were frustrated by the little connection the Afghan government had
with its people. This also led to U.S. troop role confusion about the methods of
liberation through developing a problematic regime and expecting the people to
support it.
Base host relationships were further seen as complicated due to cultural
compatibility. However while the variations of culture were repeated as a reason
for the problematic relations, power dynamics were not seen as an issue. There
was little recognition of imperialism or occupation, other than knowing that people
inside and outside perceived them in that similar role. Participants either
reinforced a dehumanizing or simple characterization of Afghans and superior
ideas of the U.S. or prided themselves on a deep analysis and understanding of
their humanity based on their read and experienced knowledge of the people.
Education was a common theme and many answered that it was needed to
improve this relationship, whether it was teaching troops to be more respectful to
their host society or for Afghans to improve their livelihoods. In conclusion I
would like to offer the troops responses to the tea party exercise.
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6.1 The Tea Party
Some of the troops interviewed through e-mail were given the opportunity
to describe their thoughts on Afghanistan and their own perceptions of their time
in the country. These are reflections after they have returned home to the U.S.,
their memories of serving in Afghanistan based on experiences that occurred
months to a decade earlier. This exercise allows soldiers to add their own
conclusions and thoughts to the process of this study. The questions posed to
the respondents are as follows:
If you were to be the host one Afghan person for tea, who would it be? Use your
imagination please. I want you to describe to me the: who, what, why, when,
where, and how of this encounter. Imagine you are unrestricted by language.
No translator needed. How would you dress? How would they? Describe this
person for me. You could have met this person or they could be based on your
knowledge or perception of Afghans. It could be an average citizen or public
figure. Whoever you personally if given the chance would want to talk to. They
could be in any group whether devout to opposition, corruption, civil or civilian
Life? Man or woman, you have the opportunity to communicate freely with this
person. What American and Afghan cultural norms would you include? What
would you talk about? What would you say about your time in Afghanistan and
interpretation of their culture? Would weapons be present? How would you sit?
Describe the scenario and your related emotions.

Below are the responses for those troops that decided to participate. These are
unedited to allow the troops to have their voices, often overshadowed or hidden
by discourse, media or social constructs, heard in full.
Right now I don't have a burning desire to talk with anyone in Afghanistan. It
might be interesting to talk with an Al-Qaeda leader and see why they do what
they do. (Bravo)

Bravo’s response shows a disinterest in communicating directly with people but
rather with engaging the idea of terrorism and its basis through the group
becoming symbolic of the term in the last decade Al Qaeda. Asking to speak with
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leadership and their actions source reveals that troops may feel confused by the
actual reasons behind political violence as opposed to the rhetoric offered usually
on superficial levels of Islamic extremism and hating American freedom.
I don’t really know how to approach this. I can say without a shadow of a doubt
that there isn’t a single Afghan, living, dead, real, or archetypal that I would ever
want to sit down and have tea with. If forced into such an encounter, I would
dress as I do normally today, in a polo and cargo pants. In regards to norms, I
would treat the whole encounter no differently than having coffee (I hate tea) with
anyone else. Pre-arranged meeting in a coffee shop, sit at a table, etc (no way in
hell is an Afghan getting in my house). No weapons, not really necessary. I
don’t think I would talk about anything. Just drink silently, stare at them, and
leave. At the end of the day, despite two years and three months in their country
I have no interest in the Afghan people, no common ground, no shared
experience, no nostalgia for that shit hole place or its residents. (Golf)

Once again a different interviewee is disinterested in meeting an Afghan after
they have returned home, adamantly this time. Golf uses the word ‘forced’ to
describe what kind of encounter would take place if he were made to do so. He
would make the meeting public and would refuse ever letting an Afghan into his
home. The level of distrust here is strong even at an imaginative level, further
complicating Alpha Yankee explanations on trust and respect. This comment is
especially interesting in that foreign militaries have a certain expectation and selfasserted right to enter the homes of Afghans either peacefully or destructively as
part of their missions and security measures. He goes on to explain if he were
sitting with them he would refuse to speak to them. This exemplifies how difficult
the relationship between foreign troops and Afghans must have been and the
public and political expectations to build a state through this association.
If I were to host an Afghan for a tea party, it would either be an ANA or an ANP
commander. I would host these people because they are in my mind the most
important people in helping coalition forces leave Afghanistan in a relatively
peaceful state. I would hold this tea party at one of their bases so that I can see
the status of their forces first hand and judge what more can be done to
strengthen their forces. I would hold this meeting at their bases because it might
help reinforce the idea that they will have to take the lead when we leave their
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country. Many ANA or ANP assume that the coalition forces will continue to
supply them after we have left and will give them our equipment when we leave,
and they rely on coalition forces to supply them with the resources needed to
sustain operations. By holding the meeting at their base, they will not see what
coalition forces have and then I can explain to them that the equipment that we
use will be taken with us, and they will have to set up their own logistical system
to sustain themselves.
For greetings, I would shake their hand first and then place my hand over
my heart and nod, which is what I have seen many Afghans do. I would hold the
tea party on a table and chairs instead of on the ground with pillows and sitting
Indian style, because while local elders may do this, I believe that the ANA and
the ANP would look more professional by sitting at a table with chairs. First I
would talk about any personal matters about the person I am talking with, such
as family and health, to help connect with this person. Then I would discuss
military matters such as training, logistics, planned operations and how they can
take more responsibility. Personally, during this type of encounter I would try to
be as diplomatic as possible, but I know I would feel a little frustrated because to
me the ANA and the ANP still rely on coalition forces to much and that they don't
want to make the necessary changes to help their own forces.
I would not personally be armed to show that I can trust them but the
people with me would be armed because of incidents of ANA or ANP shooting at
coalition forces. I would not tell them about how I feel about certain aspects of
their culture because I believe that this might upset them and I would like to
maintain as good as relationship as possible. (Hotel)

Hotel changes the course of these responses in wanting to engage with
someone that troops have a high level of contact with the Afghan National
Security Forces. His request to hold the meeting on their base as opposed to an
American base is to not encourage the Afghan commander to believe he can
keep American resources after the withdrawal. He encourages their selfsustainability and reinforces that throughout the response that in order to be
successful, Afghan forces will need to implement their own logistics. These
comments relay the tension of dependence that has been built up through the
war between not only militaries but also governments. He mentions developing a
rapport with them first to develop a connection and believes that sitting in chairs
and tables is more professional for members of the military than the traditional
seating for tea. However, he shows a balance to this Western standard by
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saying that he would mimic an Afghan greeting of respect after shaking their
hand.
I find this question a bit weird. I have had tea with many Afghanis. I don't see how
having a hypothetical tea party is really relevant unless this is a psychological
experiment. It you want me to go into detail about my actual experience with
locals during meetings that included tea, please don't hesitate to ask.
However, if I was able to host one Afghan person for tea it would be
whoever is currently the most influential and effective Taliban leader. I would let
him have a sip of tea, then promptly kill him. (Mike)

Mike is put off by the question and finds the experiment irrelevant. However his
response is incredibly poignant. His guest would be a dominant Taliban leader in
order to kill him, only “letting” him first sip his tea. This answer explains how
troops still despise and want to kill their enemy even when they are no longer in
the same arena. This response summarizes how soldiers in the study viewed
their opponents – they still discredit them and their intense opinions about them
remain.
Complicated question that deserves a simple answer, I think. I would choose to
sit with a young Afghan man, perhaps thirty-five, who has seen the evolution of
his nation’s history close up for the past twenty-years. I would dress in Afghan
dress, ideally, which simply means the loose fitting pants and shirt, a vest, and
appropriate hat. I would bring with me pictures of my family and my home, as
well as modest gifts, to share with him. I would want to have traditional Afghan
music playing, live, in the background. There would be weapons present, I
imagine, but they would be set aside, out of reach, as a matter of trust.
I would hope to engage in a very, very long and deliberate conversation
with this individual in a way that makes clear my genuine interest in his thoughts,
experiences, background, hopes and fears, interests, family and friends.
Likewise, I would want to share with him my experiences in his country, as well
as my experiences in life outside of Afghanistan and, then, try to communicate
how, in my view, my interaction with him and his country is as valuable to me as
any other experience I’ve enjoyed in my life. I think it would be difficult to
communicate my personal sense of genuine admiration for him and his country
and its people, as well as for the incredible challenges they have endured over
the decades, but I would try to accomplish that.
I would want to speak his language – though I do not, right now – rather
than expecting him to speak mine, and I would like to have enough expertise with
his traditions to ensure that he knows I know his traditions, respect them, and
find them productive and useful.
And, I would want to do this more than once – often – to build a true
friendship with this young man and, hopefully, he might one day visit me and my
family in the United States.
I think that would be about perfect. (Oscar)
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Oscar’s answer is by far one of the most optimistic scenarios. This participant
genuinely believed in the potential for what had been imagined for Afghanistan in
an ideal hegemonic intervention that allowed for a successful transition of power.
He shows a genuine interest in understanding Afghanistan and its people and
this offer the opportunity to do so it would be interesting to see his reflection on
what he learned. For as much as U.S. troops can understand about Afghanistan,
what can these lessons teach outsiders about intervention? As the cycle of
these endeavors continue, it seems as though lessons learned are not absorbed
into prevention of further hegemonic incursions tragic to these host communities
and the foreign militaries that reside on their land. Oscar relies heavily on
mimicking in this scenario as a way to develop comfort and build rapport with his
guest, describing the most orientalist practices of these encounters. He seems
to desperately want to communicate well with great understanding and also to be
understood; although he seems to have a certain sorrow in perhaps not being
able to covey his empathy for Afghan’s history. Although he would be wearing
Afghan garb, he doesn’t comment on if his identity is problematic in this
encounter or Afghan history as a member of a foreign military. He seems to
genuinely want to develop a relationship through trust and respect as opposed to
trying to win his heart or mind for military strategy. I am unsure how many troops
feel they would want to have a similar scenario, but Oscar seems to break down
the personal barriers and animosity that many troops explained being built up
through the course of the war in their opinions about Afghans.
I would choose to speak to Ahmad Shah Massoud, the Lion of Panjshir. I
imagine that he would be dressed as he usually was in life--Pashtun garb with a
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vest and some military gear. He would be wearing a sweet pakool (the Pashtun
hat) that I always saw him wearing in photos. As far as weapons, I wouldn't be
too concerned with having one. Had he not been assassinated on September 9,
2001, I think that he would have been our biggest supporter and a natural choice
for President of Afghanistan.
We would ideally be at one of his base camps, sitting under some trees
or on the wall of a centuries old fortress made out of mud and stone. We'd drink
tea, of course, and hopefully there would be lamb for dinner. I miss lamb from
the Middle East and Afghanistan. Lamb over here just doesn't ever taste as
good.
As far as conversation, I would like to ask him how he sees Afghanistan
fitting into our ever shrinking world and where he sees his countrymen in 50
years. Would he have any recommendations for how to help his nation develop,
or would he advocate leaving his country as it is, free from the pressures and
stresses that education and entrance into the global economy surely brings? I
would share my concerns--focused mainly on the lack of education, the
dangerous mixture of politics and religion, and his country's lack of respect for
women. I would also want to know about his feelings towards the NGO's present
in his country during a time of war, and whether he felt the charity was of net
benefit or ultimately fostered a dependence upon outside assistance, eroding
Afghan "self-reliance."
Finally, if I could go back in time to have this conversation in August of
2001, I would tell Ahmad not to trust Arabs in his country. There aren't too many
Arabs in Afghanistan that aren't there to foment trouble or push their own
ideological agenda. Of course, the same could be said about us, but I like to feel
that we have the benefit of at least not being the types of folks that pose as
journalists and then detonate bombs hidden inside of video cameras. Of course,
I am totally discounting Fidel Castro's exploding cigars. No, I don't count those at
all. (Uniform)
My choice would be the Lion of Panjshir – Ahmad Shah Massoud.
As his biographer states, “an engineering student turned military leader
who played a vital role in driving the Soviet Army out of Afghanistan.” Moreover,
“he strongly rejected the interpretations of Islam followed by the Taliban, or Al
Qaeda.”
With a little research, one can easily see the impact Ahmad had on, not
only the local population, but the Afghanistan populous.
To sit down and have tea, or chi, would be a momentous experience,
indeed. He is one of few people who, in recent history, has been able to bring the
population together, regardless of tribal affiliation for the betterment of the
country. That, in and of itself, is noteworthy to a more in-depth conversation.
He was a student – I am a student.
He was a seeker – I am a seeker.
He was healer – I am a healer.
He is a warrior – I am a warrior.
To this end, it appears that his ideological beliefs and my own run
parallel and we would have much in common.
To Ahmad, I would thank him for allowing me time in his beautiful country
because, as a result of my time there, my life has drastically and forever been
changed for the better. No longer do I take things for granted and let time slowly
slip away. Now I seize every opportunity to make my life, and the lives of those
around me, better – as it appears he did, also.
There would absolutely not be any weapons present – period.
My emotional state would be inquisitive, curious, and happy.
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My body language would mimic his and we would sit crossed-legged on
the floor or seated at a table; whatever he chose.
My underlying goal would just be to learn about him, why he believes
what he does, and hopeful utilize that knowledge in my everyday life. I would also
want to impart some knowledge I’ve gained and bridge a connection with him,
ensuring us more opportunities to talk and learn from one another.
To summarize, I would like to use his quote as it serves to only reiterate
why I would want to talk and learn from him:
“It is our conviction and we believe that both men and women
are created by the Almighty. Both have equal rights. Women can pursue
an education, women can pursue a career, and women can play a role in
society -- just like men.” (Whiskey)

Uniform and Whiskey both want to meet the same man, posthumously, Ahmad
Shah Massoud. How these troops describe him and they both happened to ask
to meet him is not coincidental, reflecting the iconization of the anti-Taliban
leader who was killed two days before 9/11 by al-Qaeda. They both paint a
romanticized notion of the man who has become symbolic in the fight against the
Taliban. Their flattery shows how a man that was never met but yet idolized by
the troops in that they have shared the same enemy. As Massoud didn’t live to
see the invasion, his response or approach to assisting the U.S. is speculative.
However they describe a man that would have been a benevolent ally, in their
imaginations they assume a commonality with Massoud and are pained that the
U.S. and Afghanistan never had the alliance they believe they would have had he
lived with Afghanistan. These responses highlight how strong the narratives of
heroic and villainous masculinity have been in the perceptions of U.S. troops.
Their accounts of Massoud fail to mention his own track record as a warlord
unpopular with many Afghans and seem him in a light of virtue and heroism
(Cunningham 2013).
I would want to meet with Gul Wali. He was the director of the National
Directorate of Security (NDS) at Torkham Gate. I worked with Gul on my 2nd
deployment to Afghanistan. We met every day and worked together to make our
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mission successful. Gul was extremely dedicated to his work and to helping
American troops.
I would want to meet with him just like we used to. I would go down to
Torkham Gate and meet him at the gate of his compound and hug. He would
invite me in and would have his workers lay out a spread of food and tea. We
would sit on the floor and just chat about life (no business) and eat. We would
not discuss work or operational stuff until the end.
I get pretty nostalgic about this a lot of times. Life just seemed simpler
then compared to now even though it was dangerous. I imagine that Gul and I
could just meet right now and pick up where we left off. Gul was generous
enough to give me some Afghan gifts when I left including some gifts for my
family. (Victor)

Victor offered the only response of an Afghan he actually personally knew and
worked with. His narrative is unique in that he believed a genuine rapport had
been developed with this man during his deployment. The close contact he
wanted to share was exclusive in this response. His nostalgia contradicts those
who want to avoid Afghans after their time in the arena as he wants to “pick up”
the relationship where he left off. His memories include a genuine fondness with
an Afghan person he worked with and come to know on some personal level,
which seems unique in these relationships. Although business would be on the
docket, he didn’t include comments that he had to be critical or give lessons to
Mr. Gul Wali.

6.2 Future Study
While I believe this study provided insight into troops’ views on a variety of
subjects regarding their roles in Afghanistan and foreign policy as a whole, this
study has revealed areas of future study. With proper access and resources, a
parallel study from the Afghan point of view could be very informational with
regards to these topics. Afghans would have different experiences, access, and
perceptions to the chain of events studied in this thesis. Having firsthand
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knowledge of the relationships formed with U.S. troops could complete the
picture and be compared to those given by the respondents here. Surveys and
interviews with Afghans could confirm or disprove soldiers’ ideas towards each of
the Afghan groups mentioned. These results could be valuable in identifying
which of the troop’s viewpoints were perceived or factual. They could also
provide understandings of alternate roles and gender not identified through the
experiences of American troops.
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8. List of Abbreviations
ANA
Afghan National Army
ANP

Afghan National Police

ANSF

Afghan National Security Forces

AQ

Al Qaeda

COIN

Counterinsurgency

DOD

Department of Defense

GWOT

Global War on Terror

NATO

North Atlantic Treaty Orginzation

OEF

Operation Enduring Freedom

RAWA

Revolutionary Afghan Womens Association

U.S.

United States
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9. Appendix A: Base Host Relationships in Afghanistan (Survey)

Base Host Study
1.
The American University in Cairo
Base Host Relationships in Afghanistan
Sarah Cosette

Welcome to “Base Host Relationships in Afghanistan," an academic study that examines some of the intimate dynamics between American soldiers
and Afghan civilians during the current conflict. This study is being conducted by Ms. Sarah Cosette in Las Vegas, Nevada as part of her graduate
degree requirements at the American University in Cairo. Before taking part in this study, please read the consent form below and sign/print your
name at the bottom of the page if you understand the statements and freely consent to participate in the study.

Base Host Study
2. Consent Agreement
Consent Form
This study involves survey and interview based research designed to understand how American soldiers define their roles as soldiers in foreign
military installations. How do they perceive cultural understanding, communal relations and their affect on Afghan civilians the country? In
addition how are American soldiers and veterans affected by Afghan civilians and communities? The study is being conducted by Ms. Sarah
Cosette, a master’s degree candidate of The American University in Cairo (AUC). It has been approved by the AUC Institutional Review Board (IRB).
No deception is involved, and the study understands the risk to participants as follows.
This survey and or interview will ask you to recall experiences and perceptions based on your familiarity and memories while as a military member
in Afghanistan. These recollections may promote a range of emotions. While the intent of this study is not to inconvenience you in any manner,
the researcher acknowledges that the questions may cause discomfort either now or after the study. Please skip questions that you prefer not to
answer or stop if you wish to discontinue the survey or interview at any time. Please return the survey, whether it has been fully completed or not to
the test administrator.
Please accept a list of resources available to veterans. Some of these listings will be indicated as especially helpful when supporting emotional
and stress related counseling services. Please contact these organizations with any questions about all that they have to offer since they operate to
serve you.
Participation in the survey typically takes 45 minutes. Participants’ real names will not be used in any part of the results or published work. In fact,
names are not asked for and your identity is strictly anonymous unless you indicate your willingness to participate in the personal interview and
discuss the subjects of the study more thoroughly. The principal investigator, her assistant and academic advisor will exclusively know these
participants by name. All other parties involved and those reviewing the findings whether the project is in draft or completed form will know your
responses by an identification number or manufactured named. Participants begin by answering a series of questions about their personal
demographics. The remaining five sections will consist of various questions related to base host relationships in Afghanistan.
At the end of the survey, participants have the option to leave their contact information if they wish to be interviewed further on these subjects. If
you agree to a personal interview you will have the opportunity to discuss anonymously the subject of this study and provide a more detailed
context so that the research report reflects deeper background and description than what is based solely on the survey. If you want to be considered
for an interview, please leave your contact information on the last page and your schedule and what city you live in. Your consideration for all your
involvement and service is respected and the desired outcome of this study is designed to benefit both military and foreign host communities.
Interviews will assist and further support the need to provide context for this social study. While responses and results will be discussed and
published in the paper, in no case will responses be attributed to individual participants.
If participants have further questions about this study or their rights, or if they wish to lodge a complaint or concern, they may contact the principal
investigator, Ms. Cosette. Her email related to this study is basehoststudy@gmail.com and her office phone number is 702-637-6540. The
academic advisor for the project is Dr. Amy Homes, Academic Advisor and Professor at AUC’s Department of Sociology, Anthropology, Psychology
and Egyptology. Her contact information is: holmes@aucegypt.edu.
Please proceed to the next page to begin the survey after selecting the following option.

*1. If you are 18 years of age or older, understand the statements above, and freely

consent to participate in the study, please sign and print your name and checkmark the "I
Agree" box.
If you do not want to participate in this survey, please sign and print your name and
checkmark the "I Do Not Agree" box. Please proceed to return the survey to Ms. Cosette
or the administrator who gave you the survey.
j I AGREE TO TAKE PART IN THIS STUDY AND COMPLETE THE ATTACHED SURVEY.
l
m
j I DO NOT AGREE TO TAKE PART IN THIS STUDY AND WILL NOT COMPLETE THE ATTACHED SURVEY.
l
m
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3. AFGHAN SERVICE

*1. Have you ever served in Afghanistan as part of the American Military since 2001?
j Yes
l
m

j No
l
m

Base Host Study
4. DEMOGRAPHIC & BACKGROUND INFO
1. Your current age:
j 18-23
l
m

j 24-29
l
m

j 30-35
l
m

j 36-41
l
m

j 42+
l
m

2. Are you:
j Male
l
m

j Female
l
m

3. Military Status:
j Current Military
l
m

j Veteran
l
m

4. What foreign countries have you been based in while serving in the military?

5
6
Please answer the following questions based on your circumstances while serving in the American military ONLY while in Afghanistan.

5. Branch: (Choose all that apply)
c Army
e
f

c Navy
e
f

c Marine Corps
e
f

c Air Force
e
f

c Coast Guard
e
f

6. Age while actively in Afghanistan: (Choose all that apply)
c 18-23
e
f

c 24-29
e
f

c 30-35
e
f

c 36-41
e
f

7. Base Structure(s) type that you lived in: (FOB, COB, Outpost etc)

c 42+
e
f

Base Host Study

8. Which regions did you serve in while in Afghanistan. (Please mark all that apply)
c Northwestern Region
e
f
c Northeastern Region
e
f
c Central Region (Kabul)
e
f
c Western Region
e
f
c Eastern Region
e
f
c Southern Region
e
f
c Not Sure
e
f

9. What year or years have you served in Afghanistan? (Please check all that apply)
c 2001
e
f

c 2002
e
f

c 2003
e
f

c 2004
e
f

c 2005
e
f

e 2006
f
c

c 2007
e
f

c 2008
e
f

c 2009
e
f

c 2010
e
f

10. Average Distance between your base and Afghan community(ies):
11. Afghans that you personally interacted with: (Civilians, Opposition Forces, Afghan
Military and Police etc)
Daily

Weekly

Monthly

Yearly

Never

N/A

Civilian Men

j
k
l
m
n

j
k
l
m
n

j
k
l
m
n

j
k
l
m
n

j
k
l
m
n

j
k
l
m
n

Civilian Women

j
l
m

j
l
m

j
l
m

j
l
m

j
l
m

j
l
m

Opposition Forces

j
k
l
m
n

j
k
l
m
n

j
k
l
m
n

j
k
l
m
n

j
k
l
m
n

j
k
l
m
n

Afghan Military and Police

j
l
m

j
l
m

j
l
m

j
l
m

j
l
m

j
l
m

c 20
e
f

Base Host Study
12. How was your time spent with local Afghan civilians:
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5. BASE HOST RELATIONSHIPS & CIVILIAN SUPPORT
1. How much do you agree or disagree with the following statements?
The American described, “Mission to Win the Hearts & Minds of the Afghan People is….”
Strongly Agree

Agree

Neutral

Disagree

Strongly Disagree

N/A

Important

j
k
l
m
n

j
k
l
m
n

j
k
l
m
n

j
k
l
m
n

j
k
l
m
n

j
k
l
m
n

Possible

j
l
m

j
l
m

j
l
m

j
l
m

j
l
m

j
l
m

An effective and successful

j
k
l
m
n

j
k
l
m
n

j
k
l
m
n

j
k
l
m
n

j
k
l
m
n

j
k
l
m
n

j
l
m

j
l
m

j
l
m

j
l
m

j
l
m

j
l
m

military strategy
Working well while you were
deployed in the country

2. ...Being Won or Lost Overall?
j Won
l
m
j Lost
l
m
j Not Sure
l
m

3. The American described, “Mission to Win the Hearts & Minds of the Afghan People….”
Works better with more, less

More

Less

Same

Not Sure

j
k
l
m
n

j
k
l
m
n

j
k
l
m
n

j
k
l
m
n

j
l
m

j
l
m

j
l
m

j
l
m

j
k
l
m
n

j
k
l
m
n

j
k
l
m
n

j
k
l
m
n

j
l
m

j
l
m

j
l
m

j
l
m

j
k
l
m
n

j
k
l
m
n

j
k
l
m
n

j
k
l
m
n

or the same number of
soldiers?
Works better with more, less
or the same number of
bases?
Is more effective from the
use of more or less
combat?
Needs more or less
American Non-Military
efforts?
Needs more or less security
contract firms assisting US
Military?

4. What do you feel is the BEST action American troops can take- to better the
relationships with Afghan civilians?
5. What do you feel is the WORST action American troops can take- that would result in
harming the relationships with Afghan civilians?
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6. What do you feel is the BEST action Afghan civilians can take- to better the relationships
with American troops?
7. What do you feel is the WORST action Afghan civilians can take- that would result in
harming the relationships with American troops?
How much do you agree or disagree with the following statements?

8. Based on your experiences, do you think Afghan communities trust and support…
Strongly Agree

Agree

Neutral

Disagree

Strongly Disagree

N/A

j
k
l
m
n

j
k
l
m
n

j
k
l
m
n

j
k
l
m
n

j
k
l
m
n

j
k
l
m
n

j
l
m

j
l
m

j
l
m

j
l
m

j
l
m

j
l
m

Local Tribal Leadership?

j
k
l
m
n

j
k
l
m
n

j
k
l
m
n

j
k
l
m
n

j
k
l
m
n

j
k
l
m
n

Taliban and opposition

j
l
m

j
l
m

j
l
m

j
l
m

j
l
m

j
l
m

American military forces?

j
k
l
m
n

j
k
l
m
n

j
k
l
m
n

j
k
l
m
n

j
k
l
m
n

j
k
l
m
n

NATO/ISAF?

j
l
m

j
l
m

j
l
m

j
l
m

j
l
m

j
l
m

Their current national
government?
Afghan National Army and
the Afghan National
Police?

forces?
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6. PREPARATION & EDUCATION
1. How much do you agree or disagree with the following statements?
It is important for American

Strongly Agree

Agree

Neutral

Disagree

Strongly Disagree

N/A

j
k
l
m
n

j
k
l
m
n

j
k
l
m
n

j
k
l
m
n

j
k
l
m
n

j
k
l
m
n

j
l
m

j
l
m

j
l
m

j
l
m

j
l
m

j
l
m

j
k
l
m
n

j
k
l
m
n

j
k
l
m
n

j
k
l
m
n

j
k
l
m
n

j
k
l
m
n

forces to receive education
and training about their
host community, society
and culture.
You received enough
training about Afghan
community, society and
culture BEFORE you came
to Afghanistan.
You received enough
training about Afghan
community; society and
culture WHILE you were in
Afghanistan.

2. What areas of training and education would you have liked more training on to assist
you with your goals in Afghanistan?
3. What is something you wish Afghan civilians better understood about you?
4. What is something you wish you could better understand about Afghan civilians?
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7. MISSION: OPERATION ENDURING FREEDOM
1. How much do you agree or disagree with the following statements?
The Afghan people

Strongly Agree

Agree

Neutral

Disagree

Strongly Disagree

N/A

j
k
l
m
n

j
k
l
m
n

j
k
l
m
n

j
k
l
m
n

j
k
l
m
n

j
k
l
m
n

j
l
m

j
l
m

j
l
m

j
l
m

j
l
m

j
l
m

j
k
l
m
n

j
k
l
m
n

j
k
l
m
n

j
k
l
m
n

j
k
l
m
n

j
k
l
m
n

SHOULD be liberated.
The Afghan people WANT
to be liberated.
It is the responsibility of
American forces to bring
justice to Afghanistan.

2. Who or what do Afghan civilians need to be protected from?
Some of you may have had the opportunity to interact with a range of different groups that make up Afghan society. If this is the case: you may
describe general or average qualities across the country- or you may indicate and describe the group you were most familiar with.

3. Briefly describe Afghan men’s (personality, attitude, manners, etc):
4. Briefly describe Afghan women’s (personality, attitude, manners, etc):
5. Briefly describe the Afghan youth’s (personality, attitude, manners, etc):
6. Briefly describe Afghan society, culture and values:
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8. US FORCES PURPOSE & RESPONSIBILITY
1. What do you feel is the primary purpose the American Government has for deploying
American forces to Afghanistan?
2. What are positive effects of American troop presence in Afghanistan?
3. What are negative effects of American troop presence in Afghanistan?
4. Briefly describe American soldiers in Afghanistan (personality, attitude, manners, etc):
Various voices that discuss and debate this conflict offer opposing labels about American military presence in Afghanistan. On one end some offer
the term "occupation" while those that disagree may describe it as "liberation."

5. Do you see yourself and actions more as those of an occupier or liberator?
j Occupier
l
m

j Liberator
l
m

j Both
l
m

j Neither
l
m

Other (please specify)

5
6

6. Do you believe American military operations in Afghanistan will have a lasting impact on
the country even after troops are gone?
j Yes
l
m
j No
l
m
Please Explain

5
6

7. What impact will or has Afghanistan or the people had on you after your presence
there?

Base Host Study
9. IN CLOSING
1. Please provide your contact info if you are willing to be invited for an interview with the
researcher.
NAME
STATE
PHONE and/or EMAIL:

2. Please write any additional information or comments here that you would like to offer or
want to explain more thoroughly.
3. Please type your email address here if you would like a listing of resources available to
veterans sent to you.

Sarah Cosette
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10. Appendix B: Interview Questions
1) Do you feel the average Afghan understands why foreign militaries are
present in their country? Please explain why or why not?
2) How do American government agencies (DOJ, USAID, and State Dept.
etc) relate to the Afghan population? How is this knowledge used in policy
and procedure?
3) Do you feel tribal and local leadership is connected or has enough say in
the GIRoA? Was it possible to balance tribal systems with a central unified
power?
4) Based on your experiences and observations, what role does Islam play in
Afghan society?
5) What are your observances and opinions related to Afghans administering
power currently and after American forces exit?
6) Where are efforts best spent in Afghanistan? If you could devote more or
less resources where and with whom would they be?
7) Please expand on the concept that it is difficult to for Afghans to
understand troops presence and difficult for troops to understand Afghans
allegiances and fluid nature towards troops and insurgents.
8) Do you feel gender and cultural norms dictate that Afghan women are kept
segregated and hidden because of the current and historical dangers in
the country (war, soldiers, tribal conflict) or because it is a social practice
to keep women as second class citizens? Also explain if both or neither of
these assumptions is true.
9) What is the reality of insurgency? Describe how and why there is a blend
of civilians and Taliban within the opposition? Did you find that civilians
believed in Taliban ideology and leadership or were making alliances for
survival and esteem?
10) What is the reality of counter insurgency? Did you find Afghan civilians to
invest in the American mission? Did they seem to react differently towards
your presence when “hearts and minds” was practiced? Please expand on
the assessment of the “hearts and minds” campaign in Afghanistan that
you offered in the survey.
11) What advice & warnings would you tell future generations of either
American or foreign troops that may be deployed to Afghanistan either 5
months or 500 years from now?
12) What are the three main priorities you see as what needs to be focused on
with American service members and veterans? What do you want
understood about yourselves? (Both in the USA & internationally) It can
or cannot include your time in Afghanistan. Please share.

